V-DIFT:基于矢量的动态信息流跟踪及其在逆向工程密钥定位中的应用

Antonio M. Espinoza, Jeffrey Knockel, Pedro Comesaña Alfaro, Jedidiah R. Crandall
{"title":"V-DIFT:基于矢量的动态信息流跟踪及其在逆向工程密钥定位中的应用","authors":"Antonio M. Espinoza, Jeffrey Knockel, Pedro Comesaña Alfaro, Jedidiah R. Crandall","doi":"10.1109/ARES.2016.97","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a technique for tracking information as it flows through a program's execution. DIFT systems track information by tainting data and propagating the taint marks throughout execution. These systems are designed to have minimal overhead and thus often miss indirect flows. If indirect flows were propagated naively overtainting would result, whereas propagating them effectively causes overhead. We describe the design and evaluation of a system intended for offline analysis, such as reverse engineering, that can track information through indirect flows. Our system, V-DIFT, uses a vector of floating point values for each taint mark. The use of vectors enables us to track a taint's provenance and handle indirect flows, trading off some performance for these abilities. These indirect flows via control and address dependencies are thought to be critical to tracking information flow of cryptographic programs. Therefore we tested V-DIFT's effectiveness by automatically locating keys in simple programs that use a variety of symmetric cryptographic algorithms found in three common libraries. This application does not require that the program run in real time, just that it be much faster than a manual approach. Our V-DIFT implementation tests average 3.6 seconds, and with the right parameters can identify memory locations that contain keys for 24 out of 27 algorithms tested. Our results show that many cryptographic algorithm implementations' address and/or control dependencies must be tracked for DIFT to be effective.","PeriodicalId":216417,"journal":{"name":"2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"V-DIFT: Vector-Based Dynamic Information Flow Tracking with Application to Locating Cryptographic Keys for Reverse Engineering\",\"authors\":\"Antonio M. Espinoza, Jeffrey Knockel, Pedro Comesaña Alfaro, Jedidiah R. Crandall\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ARES.2016.97\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a technique for tracking information as it flows through a program's execution. DIFT systems track information by tainting data and propagating the taint marks throughout execution. These systems are designed to have minimal overhead and thus often miss indirect flows. If indirect flows were propagated naively overtainting would result, whereas propagating them effectively causes overhead. We describe the design and evaluation of a system intended for offline analysis, such as reverse engineering, that can track information through indirect flows. Our system, V-DIFT, uses a vector of floating point values for each taint mark. The use of vectors enables us to track a taint's provenance and handle indirect flows, trading off some performance for these abilities. These indirect flows via control and address dependencies are thought to be critical to tracking information flow of cryptographic programs. Therefore we tested V-DIFT's effectiveness by automatically locating keys in simple programs that use a variety of symmetric cryptographic algorithms found in three common libraries. This application does not require that the program run in real time, just that it be much faster than a manual approach. Our V-DIFT implementation tests average 3.6 seconds, and with the right parameters can identify memory locations that contain keys for 24 out of 27 algorithms tested. Our results show that many cryptographic algorithm implementations' address and/or control dependencies must be tracked for DIFT to be effective.\",\"PeriodicalId\":216417,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2016.97\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2016.97","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6

摘要

动态信息流跟踪(DIFT)是一种跟踪信息在程序执行过程中流动的技术。DIFT系统通过污染数据并在整个执行过程中传播污染标记来跟踪信息。这些系统被设计成具有最小的开销,因此经常错过间接流。如果简单地传播间接流,将导致过度污染,而有效地传播它们则会导致开销。我们描述了用于离线分析的系统的设计和评估,例如逆向工程,它可以通过间接流跟踪信息。我们的系统,V-DIFT,对每个污点标记使用一个浮点值向量。向量的使用使我们能够跟踪污染的来源并处理间接流,为这些能力牺牲一些性能。这些通过控制和地址依赖关系的间接流被认为是跟踪密码程序信息流的关键。因此,我们测试了V-DIFT的有效性,方法是在使用三个常用库中的各种对称加密算法的简单程序中自动定位密钥。此应用程序不要求程序实时运行,只要求它比手动方法快得多。我们的V-DIFT实现测试平均3.6秒,并且使用正确的参数可以识别包含27种测试算法中的24种密钥的内存位置。我们的结果表明,许多加密算法实现的地址和/或控制依赖关系必须被跟踪才能使DIFT有效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
V-DIFT: Vector-Based Dynamic Information Flow Tracking with Application to Locating Cryptographic Keys for Reverse Engineering
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a technique for tracking information as it flows through a program's execution. DIFT systems track information by tainting data and propagating the taint marks throughout execution. These systems are designed to have minimal overhead and thus often miss indirect flows. If indirect flows were propagated naively overtainting would result, whereas propagating them effectively causes overhead. We describe the design and evaluation of a system intended for offline analysis, such as reverse engineering, that can track information through indirect flows. Our system, V-DIFT, uses a vector of floating point values for each taint mark. The use of vectors enables us to track a taint's provenance and handle indirect flows, trading off some performance for these abilities. These indirect flows via control and address dependencies are thought to be critical to tracking information flow of cryptographic programs. Therefore we tested V-DIFT's effectiveness by automatically locating keys in simple programs that use a variety of symmetric cryptographic algorithms found in three common libraries. This application does not require that the program run in real time, just that it be much faster than a manual approach. Our V-DIFT implementation tests average 3.6 seconds, and with the right parameters can identify memory locations that contain keys for 24 out of 27 algorithms tested. Our results show that many cryptographic algorithm implementations' address and/or control dependencies must be tracked for DIFT to be effective.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信