Infrastructurely Complex Territories and Intersystem Accidents: Classification from Resilience View Point

Book DOI: 10.21467/abstracts.93 According to uprising of ISF in ICT classification characteristics are related to classification characteristics according to ICT structure and can be classified according to the type of infrastructure system in which the triggering event occurred. The following types can be distinguished: accidents caused by power system failure; accidents caused by failure in gas supply system; accidents caused by failure in transport system; accidents caused by failure in water supply system; accidents caused by failure in communication system; accidents caused by failure in several systems at the same time. By the scale of accident in ICT (number of systems involved in ISF) it is possible to distinguish: distributed ISF failures occurred in 2-3 systems; macro-distributed ISF failures occurred in 4-6 systems; megadistributed ISF failures occurred in more than 6 systems. According to the level of economic consequences, intersystem accidents in ICT can be divided into: microeconomic consequences of ISF appear at the level of individual organizations; macroeconomic consequences of ISF appear at the level of totality of organizations of several branches of economy or spheres of business; mesoeconomic consequences of ISF appear at the level of individual branches of economy; megaeconomic consequences of ISF are linked to national economy, several states or sectors of world economy. According to scale of social consequences, we will mark: local accidents consequences affected groups of people; regional accidents suffered communities of people in certain territories (area, region); interregional accidents consequences are felt at national and intercountry levels. If hazardous production facilities located in ICT are present in intersystem accidents, it is advisable to carry out classification according to nature of hazardous factors: ISF with forming chemically hazards; ISF with forming fire and explosive factors; ISF with forming biologically hazardous factors; ISF with forming hydrodynamically hazards; ISF with complex appearing of hazards. Analysis of happened ISF, as well as qualitative analysis of possible topologies of ISF development scenarios in ICT, allowed the authors to propose the following classification of ISF structure in work [6]: accidents with absence of branching; accidents with branching in systems; accidents with branching between systems; accidents with branching in and between systems. The necessity for carried out analysis and classification is connected with variety of ISF and need to choose methodological and model approaches to assessment of level resilience of ICT. Acknowledgement: The abstracts were prepared with the support of the RFBR grant project "Development of theoretical foundations and practical methods for analyzing, predicting and evaluating security in intersystem interactions of critical infrastructures in urbanized areas" No. 20-010-00812A.