社会学习和客栈老板的挑战

Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
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引用次数: 12

摘要

技术进化是近几十年来人类进步的核心,它是不断引入新技术取代旧技术的过程。一项新技术并不一定意味着更好的技术,因此不应该总是被接受。社会如何才能知道哪些新事物是对现有技术的实际改进?虽然现有技术的质量是众所周知的,但新技术是一只被戳中的猪。只要有足够多的人愿意探索新技术,社会就能知道它是否确实是一种进步。然而,自我激励的代理人通常不同意探索。这是真的,特别是如果代理观察到一些对新技术感到失望的前任。受经典的多臂强盗模型的启发,我们研究了一种场景,agent依次到达,必须拉动两条臂中的一条才能获得奖励——一条风险臂(代表新技术)和一条安全臂(代表现有技术)。中央计划者必须诱导足够多的主体对风险部门进行试验。中央计划者观察所有主体的行为和回报,而主体本身有部分观察。对于每个智能体观察其前辈的设置,我们为中央计划者提供了一个(几乎)激励相容且促进社会学习的推荐算法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge
Technological evolution, so central to the progress of humanity in recent decades, is the process of constantly introducing new technologies to replace old ones. A new technology does not necessarily mean a better technology and so should not always be embraced. How can society learn which novelties present actual improvements over the existing technology? Whereas the quality of status-quo technology is well known, the new one is a pig in a poke. With sufficiently many individuals willing to explore the new technology society can learn whether it is indeed an improvement. However, self motivated agents, often, do not agree to explore. This is true, in particular, if agents observed some predecessors that were disappointed from the new technology. Inspired by the classical multi-armed bandit model we study a setting where agents arrive sequentially and must pull one of two arms in order to receive a reward - a risky arm (representing the new technology) and a safe arm (representing the existing one). A central planner must induce sufficiently many agents to experiment with the risky arm. The central planner observes the actions and rewards of all agents while the agents themselves have partial observation. For the setting where each agent observes his predecessor we provide the central planner with a recommendation algorithm that is (almost) incentive compatible and facilitates social learning.
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