Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental

Philosophers today are deeply divided by issues of a kind that can be described as "metaepistemological" -issues concerning the concepts and methodology appropriate for a philosophical investigation of human knowledge. In thinking about some of these controversial issues it seems to me helpful to draw a distinction between two kinds of epistemic merit intrinsic and instrumental. There are many things that can possess epistemic merit: educational practices, methods of scientific inquiry, moral and religious doctrines, constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and inquiry, and so on indefinitely. But I shall be talking today about the epistemic merit of propositional attitudes; and for simplicity I shall concentrate attention on just one of these, the attitude we have toward a proposition in believing it. What I shall have to say about the epistemic merit of believing can easily be extended to other attitudes like disbelieving, suspending judgment, assuming for the sake of the argument, accepting subject to further investigation, and so