{"title":"评论","authors":"John M. Abowd","doi":"10.1086/597194","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chemin and Wasmer attempt the first evaluation, to my knowledge, of French labor market interventions using the technique known as regional difference-in-differences, first popularized in labor economics by Ashenfelter (1978) and now one of theworkhorses of empirical labor economics. Their paper uses regional variation in labor market institutions, long thought to be nonexistent in France, to make a first pass at evaluating three interventions: the 1989welfare law that established aminimum income for individuals above age 25 regardless of employment status (RevenuMinimum d’Insertion), the 1978 changes to the national sick leave policy (indemnisation complémentaire), and the 1998–2000 phase-in of the French 35-hour workweek (réduction du temps de travail). My discussion will focus on the last of these experiments because it was the one that motivated the present paper and because the authors' other work indicates that they have studied this intervention more carefully than the first two. In each case, the preliminary evaluation, which is all they provide in this paper, makes use of institutional differences in the Alsace-Moselle region of France (technically a political region, Alsace, and a political département, Moselle). This region has been (infamously) disputed between France and Germany and was last subject to German national law from 1870 to 1918. As a vestige of this era, the political entities (départements) within Alsace-Moselle retain as local law some of the original German laws. Essentially, whenever the historical German laws were more generous than the prevailing French national laws, the AlsaceMoselle region was permitted to retain the more generous provisions. This regional variation provides the setting for the authors’ differencein-difference evaluation of the three interventions. As French national laws became more generous over time, they created changes in the rest of the country that did not occur as sharply in Alsace-Moselle because in that region the applicable laws were already more generous.","PeriodicalId":353207,"journal":{"name":"NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Comment\",\"authors\":\"John M. 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My discussion will focus on the last of these experiments because it was the one that motivated the present paper and because the authors' other work indicates that they have studied this intervention more carefully than the first two. In each case, the preliminary evaluation, which is all they provide in this paper, makes use of institutional differences in the Alsace-Moselle region of France (technically a political region, Alsace, and a political département, Moselle). This region has been (infamously) disputed between France and Germany and was last subject to German national law from 1870 to 1918. As a vestige of this era, the political entities (départements) within Alsace-Moselle retain as local law some of the original German laws. Essentially, whenever the historical German laws were more generous than the prevailing French national laws, the AlsaceMoselle region was permitted to retain the more generous provisions. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
据我所知,Chemin和Wasmer第一次尝试对法国劳动力市场干预进行评估,他们使用了被称为“区域差异中的差异”的技术,该技术首先由Ashenfelter(1978)在劳动经济学中推广开来,现在是实证劳动经济学的主力神之一。他们的论文利用劳动力市场制度的地区差异(法国长期以来被认为是不存在的),首次评估了三种干预措施:1989年的福利法规定了25岁以上个人的最低收入,无论其就业状况如何(revenumimum d’insertion), 1978年对国家病假政策的修改(compensation complimentaire),以及1998-2000年法国每周35小时工作制的逐步实施(r ducduction du temps de travail)。我的讨论将集中在这些实验中的最后一个,因为它是本论文的动机,因为作者的其他工作表明,他们比前两个更仔细地研究了这种干预。在每种情况下,他们在本文中提供的初步评估都利用了法国阿尔萨斯-摩泽尔地区(技术上是一个政治区域阿尔萨斯和一个政治区域摩泽尔)的制度差异。这个地区一直是法国和德国之间的(臭名昭著的)争议地区,从1870年到1918年,它最后一次受到德国国家法律的管辖。作为这个时代的遗迹,阿尔萨斯-摩泽尔地区的政治实体保留了一些原始的德国法律作为地方法律。基本上,只要历史上的德国法律比现行的法国国家法律更慷慨,就允许阿尔萨斯-莫塞尔地区保留更慷慨的规定。这种区域差异为作者对三种干预措施的差异评价提供了背景。随着时间的推移,法国的国家法律变得更加慷慨,它们在该国其他地区造成了变化,而在阿尔萨斯-摩泽尔地区没有发生如此剧烈的变化,因为在该地区适用的法律已经更加慷慨。
Chemin and Wasmer attempt the first evaluation, to my knowledge, of French labor market interventions using the technique known as regional difference-in-differences, first popularized in labor economics by Ashenfelter (1978) and now one of theworkhorses of empirical labor economics. Their paper uses regional variation in labor market institutions, long thought to be nonexistent in France, to make a first pass at evaluating three interventions: the 1989welfare law that established aminimum income for individuals above age 25 regardless of employment status (RevenuMinimum d’Insertion), the 1978 changes to the national sick leave policy (indemnisation complémentaire), and the 1998–2000 phase-in of the French 35-hour workweek (réduction du temps de travail). My discussion will focus on the last of these experiments because it was the one that motivated the present paper and because the authors' other work indicates that they have studied this intervention more carefully than the first two. In each case, the preliminary evaluation, which is all they provide in this paper, makes use of institutional differences in the Alsace-Moselle region of France (technically a political region, Alsace, and a political département, Moselle). This region has been (infamously) disputed between France and Germany and was last subject to German national law from 1870 to 1918. As a vestige of this era, the political entities (départements) within Alsace-Moselle retain as local law some of the original German laws. Essentially, whenever the historical German laws were more generous than the prevailing French national laws, the AlsaceMoselle region was permitted to retain the more generous provisions. This regional variation provides the setting for the authors’ differencein-difference evaluation of the three interventions. As French national laws became more generous over time, they created changes in the rest of the country that did not occur as sharply in Alsace-Moselle because in that region the applicable laws were already more generous.