权益重审

Rowan Cruft
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第五章对第二章提出的关于权利、利益与欲望关系的四个问题进行了梳理。它解释了为什么——根据第四章的“地址性”分析——我们可以通过法律或公约在任何地方创造权利,而不受权利持有人的利益或愿望的影响。它还概述了一种观点(在第7章更详细地讨论),即前传统的“自然”权利必须建立在权利所有者自身利益的基础上。这一章接着解释了为什么所有的权利在实现自己的过程中都会产生一种地位欲望或利益,最后解释了为什么绝大多数道德上正当的权利,包括法律上和传统上创造的权利,必然服务于其持有者的独立利益或欲望——也就是说,为什么克莱默和韦纳的描述非常接近正确。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rights and Interests Revisited
Chapter 5 takes up four questions about the relation between rights, interests, and desires raised by Chapter 2. It explains why—given Chapter 4’s ‘Addressive’ analysis—we can create rights wherever we want through law or convention, independently of the right-holder’s interests or desires. It also sketches the idea (taken up at greater length in Chapter 7) that pre-conventional ‘natural’ rights must be grounded in the right-holder’s own good. The chapter goes on to explain why all rights create a status desire or interest in their own fulfilment, and it ends by explaining why the vast majority of morally justified rights, including legally and conventionally created rights, necessarily serve their holders’ independent interests or desires—that is, why Kramer’s and Wenar’s accounts are very nearly correct.
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