{"title":"频繁收购者与管理层薪酬","authors":"C. Mishra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3508081","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We find significant positive contemporaneous, short-run, and long-run effects of an increase in the acquisition rate on management compensation. The long-run effect of an additional deal completed each year by an average acquirer increases management’s total, equity, and cash compensation by 21 percent, 7 percent, and 22 percent, respectively. Frequent acquirers, on average, pay their management 46 percent higher in total compensation, 55 percent higher in equity-based compensation, and 6 percent higher in cash-based (short-term) compensation, relative to non-frequent acquirers. Frequent acquirers pay higher equity-based compensation than cash-based compensation compared to non-frequent acquirers. Further, the impact of the acquisition rate on management compensation is higher for value-enhancing acquirers relative to value-destroying acquirers. We find a positive bi-directional influence between acquisition frequency and management compensation. Operationally more efficient acquirers are less likely to have a higher acquisition rate. Further, frequent acquisitions do not improve an acquirer’s operational efficiency, possibly due to constant post-acquisition integration challenges. We find a positive bi-directional causality between the total q (firm value) and the acquisition frequency, which may explain a positive association between overvalued stocks and acquisition frequency. A higher market value is likely to associate with higher acquisition frequency that is further likely to be associated with higher management compensation, Further, acquisition rate has a positive impact on the market share. Acquirers with a lower market share are more likely to become frequent acquirers. A causal order appears to exist from a lower market share to a higher acquisition frequency to a higher market value of the firm to higher management compensation. The increase in shareholder value associated with a higher acquisition frequency is not likely due to a gain in the operational efficiency, but morel likely due to an increase in the growth opportunities and market share of the acquirer. We find another causal order from a lower operational efficiency to a higher acquisition rate to a higher market share to higher management compensation. The causal orders may also explain why some studies may find a negative relation between management compensation and firm performance.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Frequent Acquirers and Management Compensation\",\"authors\":\"C. Mishra\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3508081\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We find significant positive contemporaneous, short-run, and long-run effects of an increase in the acquisition rate on management compensation. The long-run effect of an additional deal completed each year by an average acquirer increases management’s total, equity, and cash compensation by 21 percent, 7 percent, and 22 percent, respectively. Frequent acquirers, on average, pay their management 46 percent higher in total compensation, 55 percent higher in equity-based compensation, and 6 percent higher in cash-based (short-term) compensation, relative to non-frequent acquirers. Frequent acquirers pay higher equity-based compensation than cash-based compensation compared to non-frequent acquirers. Further, the impact of the acquisition rate on management compensation is higher for value-enhancing acquirers relative to value-destroying acquirers. We find a positive bi-directional influence between acquisition frequency and management compensation. Operationally more efficient acquirers are less likely to have a higher acquisition rate. Further, frequent acquisitions do not improve an acquirer’s operational efficiency, possibly due to constant post-acquisition integration challenges. We find a positive bi-directional causality between the total q (firm value) and the acquisition frequency, which may explain a positive association between overvalued stocks and acquisition frequency. A higher market value is likely to associate with higher acquisition frequency that is further likely to be associated with higher management compensation, Further, acquisition rate has a positive impact on the market share. Acquirers with a lower market share are more likely to become frequent acquirers. A causal order appears to exist from a lower market share to a higher acquisition frequency to a higher market value of the firm to higher management compensation. The increase in shareholder value associated with a higher acquisition frequency is not likely due to a gain in the operational efficiency, but morel likely due to an increase in the growth opportunities and market share of the acquirer. We find another causal order from a lower operational efficiency to a higher acquisition rate to a higher market share to higher management compensation. The causal orders may also explain why some studies may find a negative relation between management compensation and firm performance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":228319,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-10-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508081\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508081","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We find significant positive contemporaneous, short-run, and long-run effects of an increase in the acquisition rate on management compensation. The long-run effect of an additional deal completed each year by an average acquirer increases management’s total, equity, and cash compensation by 21 percent, 7 percent, and 22 percent, respectively. Frequent acquirers, on average, pay their management 46 percent higher in total compensation, 55 percent higher in equity-based compensation, and 6 percent higher in cash-based (short-term) compensation, relative to non-frequent acquirers. Frequent acquirers pay higher equity-based compensation than cash-based compensation compared to non-frequent acquirers. Further, the impact of the acquisition rate on management compensation is higher for value-enhancing acquirers relative to value-destroying acquirers. We find a positive bi-directional influence between acquisition frequency and management compensation. Operationally more efficient acquirers are less likely to have a higher acquisition rate. Further, frequent acquisitions do not improve an acquirer’s operational efficiency, possibly due to constant post-acquisition integration challenges. We find a positive bi-directional causality between the total q (firm value) and the acquisition frequency, which may explain a positive association between overvalued stocks and acquisition frequency. A higher market value is likely to associate with higher acquisition frequency that is further likely to be associated with higher management compensation, Further, acquisition rate has a positive impact on the market share. Acquirers with a lower market share are more likely to become frequent acquirers. A causal order appears to exist from a lower market share to a higher acquisition frequency to a higher market value of the firm to higher management compensation. The increase in shareholder value associated with a higher acquisition frequency is not likely due to a gain in the operational efficiency, but morel likely due to an increase in the growth opportunities and market share of the acquirer. We find another causal order from a lower operational efficiency to a higher acquisition rate to a higher market share to higher management compensation. The causal orders may also explain why some studies may find a negative relation between management compensation and firm performance.