联邦制、监管滞后和能源生产的政治经济学

D. Spence
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引用次数: 51

摘要

利用水力压裂技术从以前难以开采的页岩地层中开采天然气,扩大了国内能源供应,降低了价格,并可能刺激更清洁的天然气取代污染更严重的化石燃料(煤和石油)。与此同时,页岩气生产已被证明存在争议,在美国一些地区引发了强烈反对。州和地方监管机构都在争先恐后地适应天然气生产的繁荣,这引发了一个问题:联邦监管机构是否应该介入,取代或补充州监管。本文采用政策中立的方法来解决该调查中心的联邦制问题,询问哪一级政府应该解决这些政策问题,而不是哪一级政府可能产生特别有利的政策结果。因此,本分析从我们通常用来证明联邦监管合理性的四个经济和政治理由开始:(i)州际“溢出”效应的存在,(ii)所谓的“逐底竞争”,(iii)对制造商统一标准的需要,以及(iv)在开发和监管能源方面存在重要的国家利益。将这些理论应用于水力压裂的调控,可以得出几个重要的结论。首先,尽管页岩气生产的一些外部性是跨州的,但大多数都是在当地经历的。其次,现有的联邦监管制度提供了充分的权力来处理那些具有州际或全国范围的影响。第三,“逐底竞争”的理论并不能证明联邦政府对页岩气生产进行监管是合理的,因为页岩气州并不会争夺数量或时间限制的资本投资。第四,考虑到水力压裂的影响仍在研究中,并且存在相当多的争论,目前还没有凌驾于一切的国家利益支持为页岩气生产建立一个全面的联邦许可/监管制度,至少目前还没有。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production
The production of natural gas from formerly inaccessible shale formations using hydraulic fracturing has expanded domestic energy supplies, lowered prices, and could stimulate the replacement of dirtier fossil fuels (coal and oil) with cleaner natural gas. At the same time, shale gas production has proven controversial, triggering intense opposition in some parts of the United States. State and local regulators have scrambled to adapt to the boom in natural gas production, raising the question of whether federal regulators should step in to supplant or supplement state regulation. This article takes a policy-neutral approach to the federalism questions at the center of that inquiry, asking which level of government ought to resolve these policy questions, rather than which level of government is likely to produce a particular favored policy outcome. Consequently, this analysis begins with four economic and political rationales that we typically use to justify federal regulation: (i) the presence of interstate “spillover” effects, (ii) the so-called “race to the bottom, (iii) the need for uniform standards for manufacturers, and (iv) the presence of an important national interest in developing and regulating an energy resource. Applying each of these rationales to the regulation of hydraulic fracturing yields several important conclusions. First, while a few of the externalities of shale gas production cross state boundaries, most are experienced locally. Second, existing federal regulatory regimes offer ample authority to address those impacts that have interstate or national scope. Third, the race to the bottom rationale does not justify federal regulation of shale gas production because shale gas states are not competing for quantity- or time-limited capital investment. Fourth, given that the impacts of hydraulic fracturing are still under study and the subject of considerable ongoing debate, there is no overriding national interest supporting the creation of a comprehensive federal licensing/regulatory regime for shale gas production, at least not yet.
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