经济预测和货币政策的经验法则

Athanasios Orphanides, V. Wieland
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引用次数: 103

摘要

货币政策分析师通常依靠经验法则,如泰勒法则,来描述历史上的货币政策决定,并将当前政策与历史规范进行比较。沿着这些思路进行的分析还允许对政策可能偏离简单规则的事件进行评估,并审查这种偏离背后的原因。一个有趣的问题是,这种经验法则是应该基于政策制定者对通胀和失业率等关键变量的预测,还是基于观察到的结果。重要的是,政策偏离依赖于结果的泰勒规则的处方,可能是由于对决策者自己预测中捕获的信息的系统反应。我们在过去20年的联邦公开市场委员会政策决定的背景下研究了这一命题,使用了联邦公开市场委员会从两年一次的向国会提交的货币政策报告中得出的预测(Humphrey-Hawkins报告)。我们的结果表明,联邦公开市场委员会的决定确实可以主要用联邦公开市场委员会自己的预测来解释,而不是观察到的结果。因此,基于预测的经验法则更好地表征了FOMC的决策。我们还确认,联邦基金利率与基于结果的泰勒式规则的许多明显偏差可能被视为对联邦公开市场委员会预测中包含的信息的系统性反应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Economic Projections and Rules-of-Thumb for Monetary Policy
Monetary policy analysts often rely on rules-of-thumb, such as the Taylor rule, to describe historical monetary policy decisions and to compare current policy to historical norms. Analysis along these lines also permits evaluation of episodes where policy may have deviated from a simple rule and examination of the reasons behind such deviations. One interesting question is whether such rules-of-thumb should draw on policymakers' forecasts of key variables such as inflation and unemployment or on observed outcomes. Importantly, deviations of the policy from the prescriptions of a Taylor rule that relies on outcomes may be due to systematic responses to information captured in policymakers' own projections. We investigate this proposition in the context of FOMC policy decisions over the past 20 years using publicly available FOMC projections from the biannual monetary policy reports to the Congress (Humphrey-Hawkins reports). Our results indicate that FOMC decisions can indeed be predominantly explained in terms of the FOMC's own projections rather than observed outcomes. Thus, a forecast-based rule-of-thumb better characterizes FOMC decision-making. We also confirm that many of the apparent deviations of the federal funds rate from an outcome-based Taylor-style rule may be considered systematic responses to information contained in FOMC projections.
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