激励手段和绩效衡量的权重

Dipankar Ghosh, A. Wu, Ling-Chu Lee
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引用次数: 0

摘要

衡量指标权重的研究通常一次只考察一种激励措施(通常是奖金),并且在非财务绩效(NFM)指标与评估和奖励长期员工的相关性方面提供了不同的发现。使用来自汽车经销商组织的专有数据,我们表明财务指标(FM)对奖金的权重大于对绩效加薪和晋升的权重,但NFM对绩效加薪和晋升的权重大于FM。因此,措施和激励的时间方向似乎是一致的:FM (NFM)的短期(长期)性质平行于激励的时间范围。接下来,我们的探索性研究问题发现,对于奖金,FM和NFM对初级和高级管理人员都具有相似水平的显著和积极影响。但在晋升方面,FM对两组的影响都不显著。相比之下,NFM对晋升的影响不仅对两组都显著,而且对初级管理者的影响明显大于对高级管理者的影响。也就是说,对高级管理人员的NFM评价对其晋升的影响小于对初级管理人员的影响,这表明高级管理人员的晋升往往是基于其正式绩效以外的因素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Incentive Instruments and the Weighting of Performance Measures
Research on weighting of measures often examines only one incentive at a time (usually bonus) and provide mixed findings regarding the relevance of non-financial performance (NFM) measures to evaluate and reward long-term time horizon employees. Using proprietary data from an auto dealership organization, we show that financial measures (FM) are weighted more for bonus than they are weighted for merit raise and promotion but NFM are weighted more than FM for merit raise and promotion. Thus, the temporal orientations of the measures and incentives seem to be aligned: the short-term (long-term) nature of FM (NFM) parallel’s the time horizon of the incentives. Next, our exploratory research questions find that for bonuses, both FM and NFM exert similar levels of significant and positive influence on junior and senior managers. But for promotions, the influence of FM is insignificant for both groups. In contrast, the influence of NFM on promotions is not only significant for both groups but is significantly greater for junior managers than it is for senior managers. That is, the evaluations of NFM for senior managers are less influential on their promotion than they are for junior managers suggesting that promotions for senior managers are often based on factors other than their formal performances.
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