欧盟收购指令对收购绩效和帝国建设的影响

M. Humphery‐Jenner
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引用次数: 53

摘要

本文将欧盟收购指令作为一个自然实验,以检验法律协调何时创造价值,并检验加强堑壕对投资决策的影响。欧盟于2004年4月颁布了收购指令。实施的最后期限是2006年5月。其目标是通过协调整个欧盟的收购法律来鼓励创造价值的收购。然而,收购指令因含糊其辞、自由裁量,以及对管理者的固化而受到批评。我的假设是,由于该指令阻碍了收购,它可能会加强管理层的巩固,并使欧盟公司的管理者能够进行机构驱动的投资(或者只是不那么自律)。我找到了支持性的证据:在该指令出台后,欧盟企业进行的投资(以收购回报为代表)利润较低,竞争时间更长。此外,收购指令下达后,被收购公司的资产增长有所增加,这表明额外的防御工事有助于帝国的建立。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Impact of the EU Takeover Directive on Takeover Performance and Empire Building
This paper uses the EU takeover directive as a natural experiment to test when legal harmonization creates value, and to examine the impact of increased entrenchment on investment decisions. The EU promulgated the takeover directive in April 2004. The implementation deadline was May 2006. The goal was to encourage value-creating takeovers by harmonizing takeover laws across the EU. However, the takeover directive has received criticism for being vague and discretionary, and for entrenching managers. I hypothesize that because the directive hinders takeovers, it might increase managerial entrenchment and enable managers of EU-companies to make agency-motivated investments (or simply exercise less discipline). I find supportive evidence: after the directive, EU-companies make investments that are less profitable (as proxied by takeover returns) and that take longer to compete. Further, asset growth increased in treated companies following the takeover directive, suggesting that the additional entrenchment facilitates empire building.
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