{"title":"国际立法过程:英国的创新实践及其在将国际规范转化为国内法中的应用","authors":"Frances Meadows","doi":"10.1163/157180404773166019","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"History When parties to an international convention undertake to make certain types of behaviour a criminal offence within their own countries, this will, almost irrespective of constitutional variations, require to be implemented by national legislation. Such is the case with Article 1 of the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Of cials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”). Parties are required to “take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence (...) for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public of cial (...) in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”. The article goes on to provide an autonomous de nition of what, for the purposes of the Convention, constitutes a “foreign public of cial”, though there is no express obligation to adopt the de nition as such. The parties to the OECD Convention, including member states of the OECD as well as other signatories, undertake to submit to a process of monitoring, in the form of peer review of their compliance. Peer review mechanisms, to date used mostly in the consensus-based OECD context, can provide a valuable tool for encouraging and assisting in the implementation of international obligations in national law. In the case of the OECD Convention, this review comprises two phases: in the rst, each country’s implementing legislation is examined to ensure that its criminal provisions ful l the speci c requirements as to the elements of the offence; the second phase examines the implementation in practice of the legislation. When the United Kingdom underwent Phase 1 of the monitoring process, the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted certain de ciencies in the state of the UK law as it then existed, and recommended reforms. After the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 12 of which dealt speci cally with foreign bribery, a further “Phase 1 bis” review was conducted. This second review found that, when taken together, the UK bribery laws now in force covered the required elements of the offence. However, the Working Group was still concerned about the fragmented and inconsistent nature of the UK law. It is, still, a less than coherent mix of common law and statutes, some of them antiquated, which are too confusing to lend themselves to easy enforcement. The UK Law","PeriodicalId":148959,"journal":{"name":"International Law Forum Du Droit International","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The International Law-Making Process: An Innovative UK Practice and Its Use in Transposing International Norms into Domestic Law\",\"authors\":\"Frances Meadows\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/157180404773166019\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"History When parties to an international convention undertake to make certain types of behaviour a criminal offence within their own countries, this will, almost irrespective of constitutional variations, require to be implemented by national legislation. Such is the case with Article 1 of the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Of cials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”). Parties are required to “take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence (...) for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public of cial (...) in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”. The article goes on to provide an autonomous de nition of what, for the purposes of the Convention, constitutes a “foreign public of cial”, though there is no express obligation to adopt the de nition as such. The parties to the OECD Convention, including member states of the OECD as well as other signatories, undertake to submit to a process of monitoring, in the form of peer review of their compliance. Peer review mechanisms, to date used mostly in the consensus-based OECD context, can provide a valuable tool for encouraging and assisting in the implementation of international obligations in national law. In the case of the OECD Convention, this review comprises two phases: in the rst, each country’s implementing legislation is examined to ensure that its criminal provisions ful l the speci c requirements as to the elements of the offence; the second phase examines the implementation in practice of the legislation. When the United Kingdom underwent Phase 1 of the monitoring process, the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted certain de ciencies in the state of the UK law as it then existed, and recommended reforms. After the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 12 of which dealt speci cally with foreign bribery, a further “Phase 1 bis” review was conducted. This second review found that, when taken together, the UK bribery laws now in force covered the required elements of the offence. However, the Working Group was still concerned about the fragmented and inconsistent nature of the UK law. It is, still, a less than coherent mix of common law and statutes, some of them antiquated, which are too confusing to lend themselves to easy enforcement. 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The International Law-Making Process: An Innovative UK Practice and Its Use in Transposing International Norms into Domestic Law
History When parties to an international convention undertake to make certain types of behaviour a criminal offence within their own countries, this will, almost irrespective of constitutional variations, require to be implemented by national legislation. Such is the case with Article 1 of the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Of cials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”). Parties are required to “take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence (...) for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public of cial (...) in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”. The article goes on to provide an autonomous de nition of what, for the purposes of the Convention, constitutes a “foreign public of cial”, though there is no express obligation to adopt the de nition as such. The parties to the OECD Convention, including member states of the OECD as well as other signatories, undertake to submit to a process of monitoring, in the form of peer review of their compliance. Peer review mechanisms, to date used mostly in the consensus-based OECD context, can provide a valuable tool for encouraging and assisting in the implementation of international obligations in national law. In the case of the OECD Convention, this review comprises two phases: in the rst, each country’s implementing legislation is examined to ensure that its criminal provisions ful l the speci c requirements as to the elements of the offence; the second phase examines the implementation in practice of the legislation. When the United Kingdom underwent Phase 1 of the monitoring process, the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted certain de ciencies in the state of the UK law as it then existed, and recommended reforms. After the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 12 of which dealt speci cally with foreign bribery, a further “Phase 1 bis” review was conducted. This second review found that, when taken together, the UK bribery laws now in force covered the required elements of the offence. However, the Working Group was still concerned about the fragmented and inconsistent nature of the UK law. It is, still, a less than coherent mix of common law and statutes, some of them antiquated, which are too confusing to lend themselves to easy enforcement. The UK Law