无效、不道德、政治便利:美国对经济制裁的过度依赖及其应对之策

R. Hanania
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引用次数: 2

摘要

美国对大约24个国家实施了制裁,其中一些国家几乎处于全面经济禁运状态。为什么这些政策到位,它们有什么影响,以及它们在实现地缘政治目标方面有多成功?制裁付出了巨大的人道主义代价,不仅无效,而且可能适得其反。在这些观点上,学术文献中有压倒性的共识。这种政策可能会降低目标国家的经济绩效,降低公共卫生水平,并在最严厉的制裁制度下每年造成数万人死亡。此外,他们几乎总是无法实现自己的目标,特别是当他们的目的是改变政权或重大的行为改变与国家认为的根本利益有关时。制裁甚至可能适得其反,使大规模屠杀和镇压更有可能发生,同时降低民主化的可能性。那么,为什么美国如此频繁地使用经济制裁呢?制裁之所以受欢迎,更多地是出于政客的国内利益,而非他们实现地缘政治目标的能力。美国的政策制定者对制裁的实证研究兴趣不大,而且他们通常不会在贸易限制的基础上辅以有助于达成协议的外交努力。相反,从国内政治和政治心理的角度来看,制裁是有意义的。它们在军事力量和无所作为之间提供了一个中间地带,不太可能在国内引起反弹,因为它们造成的损害是间接的,而且基本上没有被观察到。考虑到政治现实,以下是防止过度使用制裁的几点建议:在实施制裁时,制裁应限于象征性目标,这将使美国领导人能够在不伤害国外无辜民众的情况下实现其政治目标;美国应该在执行当前和未来的制裁制度方面更加宽松;国会应该立法,使行政部门更难以单方面无限期地实施制裁,这将为受影响的人创造一个法律诉讼理由。最后,现行政策的反对者应继续使公众意识到强力制裁的影响,因为这会消除制定和执行制裁的政治动机。实施严厉的经济制裁往往被视为一种无效的政策,这种政策会出于自身利益的原因伤害国外的无辜民众,那么实施制裁的可能性就越小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ineffective, Immoral, Politically Convenient: America's Overreliance on Economic Sanctions and What to Do About It
American sanctions target around two dozen countries, with some states experiencing what amounts to near-total economic embargoes. Why are these policies in place, what effects do they have, and how successful are they in achieving their geopolitical objectives? Sanctions have massive humanitarian costs and are not only ineffective but likely counterproductive. On these points, there is overwhelming agreement in the academic literature. Such policies can reduce the economic performance of the targeted state, degrade public health, and cause tens of thousands of deaths per year under the most crushing sanctions regimes. Moreover, they almost always fail to achieve their goals, particularly when the aim is regime change or significant behavioral changes pertaining to what states consider their fundamental interests. Sanctions can even backfire, making mass killing and repression more likely, while decreasing the probability of democratization.

Why, then, does the United States use economic sanctions so often? The popularity of sanctions owes more to the domestic interests of politicians than their ability to achieve geopolitical goals. American policymakers show little interest in the empirical research on sanctions and they often do not supplement trade restrictions with diplomatic efforts that can help achieve a bargain. In contrast, sanctions make sense from the perspective of domestic politics and political psychology. They provide a middle ground between military force and doing nothing and are unlikely to cause a domestic backlash because the damage they inflict is indirect and largely unobserved. Taking into account political realities, here are several suggestions to prevent the overuse of sanctions: when implemented, they should be restricted to symbolic targets, which would allow American leaders to achieve their political goals without harming innocents abroad; the United States should be laxer in the enforcement of current and future sanctions regimes; and Congress should legislate to make it more difficult for the executive branch to unilaterally impose sanctions without end, which would create a legal cause of action for those affected. Finally, opponents of current policies should continue to make the public aware of the effects of robust sanctions, which can remove the political incentive to enact and implement them. The more often that imposing heavy economic sanctions is seen as an ineffective policy that harms innocents abroad for self‐interested reasons, the less likely they are to be used.
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