{"title":"法律的理想维度","authors":"R. Alexy","doi":"10.1017/9781316341544.012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Alexy’s thesis that law has an ideal dimension is essentially based on the argument that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness that includes a claim to moral correctness. John Finnis has contested the necessity of this connection between law and a claim with moral content. One implication of the claim to correctness is the Radbruch Formula, which says that extreme injustice is no law. Finnis also criticizes this formula. In this chapter arguments against Finnis’s two critical points are presented. This is further elaborated into a system of the institutionalization of reason that comprises not only the Radbruch Formula but also the special case thesis, human rights, democracy, and principles theory.","PeriodicalId":142448,"journal":{"name":"Law's Ideal Dimension","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Ideal Dimension of Law\",\"authors\":\"R. Alexy\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/9781316341544.012\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Alexy’s thesis that law has an ideal dimension is essentially based on the argument that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness that includes a claim to moral correctness. John Finnis has contested the necessity of this connection between law and a claim with moral content. One implication of the claim to correctness is the Radbruch Formula, which says that extreme injustice is no law. Finnis also criticizes this formula. In this chapter arguments against Finnis’s two critical points are presented. This is further elaborated into a system of the institutionalization of reason that comprises not only the Radbruch Formula but also the special case thesis, human rights, democracy, and principles theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":142448,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law's Ideal Dimension\",\"volume\":\"36 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law's Ideal Dimension\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316341544.012\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law's Ideal Dimension","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316341544.012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Alexy’s thesis that law has an ideal dimension is essentially based on the argument that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness that includes a claim to moral correctness. John Finnis has contested the necessity of this connection between law and a claim with moral content. One implication of the claim to correctness is the Radbruch Formula, which says that extreme injustice is no law. Finnis also criticizes this formula. In this chapter arguments against Finnis’s two critical points are presented. This is further elaborated into a system of the institutionalization of reason that comprises not only the Radbruch Formula but also the special case thesis, human rights, democracy, and principles theory.