当金融科技争夺支付流时

Christine A. Parlour, U. Rajan, Haoxiang Zhu
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引用次数: 22

摘要

我们研究了当银行依靠消费者的支付数据获取有关其信用质量的信息时,金融科技竞争对支付服务的影响。来自金融科技支付提供商的竞争破坏了这种信息溢出,降低了银行的贷款质量和利润。金融科技竞争有利于银行亲和力较弱的消费者(普惠金融得到改善),但可能会损害银行亲和力较强的消费者。我们考虑了支付信息回流到信贷市场的三种机制:金融科技贷款、数据销售和消费者数据可移植性。这三种制度都提高了贷款质量,尽管它们对银行利润和消费者福利的影响尚不明确。我们的研究结果强调了在金融科技支付竞争之后,消费者福利与银行稳定性之间重要而复杂的权衡关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When FinTech Competes for Payment Flows
We study the impact of FinTech competition in payment services when banks rely on consumers' payment data to obtain information about their credit quality. Competition from FinTech payment providers disrupts this information spillover, reducing the bank's loan quality and profit. FinTech competition benefits consumers with weak bank affinity (financial inclusion improves), but may hurt consumers with strong bank affinity. We consider three regimes in which payment information flows back into the credit market: FinTech lending, data sales, and consumer data portability. All three regimes improve the quality of loans, although their effects for bank profit and consumer welfare are ambiguous. Our results highlight the important and complex trade-off between consumer welfare and the stability of banks following FinTech competition in payment.
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