{"title":"价值过高?","authors":"R. Rowland","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833611.003.0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to the Buck-Passing Account (BPA), for X to be good is for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. Suppose that a demon will punish everyone if they do not admire it. There are reasons for everyone to admire the demon, so BPA entails that it is good, but it is not good. So, BPA produces too much value. This chapter argues that this problem, often dubbed the wrong kind of reason problem, can be dissolved because there are no reasons to admire the demon. But, this chapter argues, even if there are reasons to admire the demon this does not show that BPA should be rejected, but only that it should be revised to hold that the reasons for pro-attitudes in BPA are reasons to have pro-attitudes that are not provided or enabled by facts about the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.","PeriodicalId":204065,"journal":{"name":"The Normative and the Evaluative","volume":"2012 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Too Much Value?\",\"authors\":\"R. Rowland\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198833611.003.0006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to the Buck-Passing Account (BPA), for X to be good is for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. Suppose that a demon will punish everyone if they do not admire it. There are reasons for everyone to admire the demon, so BPA entails that it is good, but it is not good. So, BPA produces too much value. This chapter argues that this problem, often dubbed the wrong kind of reason problem, can be dissolved because there are no reasons to admire the demon. But, this chapter argues, even if there are reasons to admire the demon this does not show that BPA should be rejected, but only that it should be revised to hold that the reasons for pro-attitudes in BPA are reasons to have pro-attitudes that are not provided or enabled by facts about the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":204065,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Normative and the Evaluative\",\"volume\":\"2012 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-02-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Normative and the Evaluative\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833611.003.0006\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Normative and the Evaluative","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833611.003.0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the Buck-Passing Account (BPA), for X to be good is for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. Suppose that a demon will punish everyone if they do not admire it. There are reasons for everyone to admire the demon, so BPA entails that it is good, but it is not good. So, BPA produces too much value. This chapter argues that this problem, often dubbed the wrong kind of reason problem, can be dissolved because there are no reasons to admire the demon. But, this chapter argues, even if there are reasons to admire the demon this does not show that BPA should be rejected, but only that it should be revised to hold that the reasons for pro-attitudes in BPA are reasons to have pro-attitudes that are not provided or enabled by facts about the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.