{"title":"ShadowDroid:针对基于ml的Android恶意软件检测的实用黑盒攻击","authors":"Jin Zhang, Chennan Zhang, Xiangyu Liu, Yuncheng Wang, Wenrui Diao, Shanqing Guo","doi":"10.1109/ICPADS53394.2021.00084","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Machine learning (ML) techniques have been widely deployed in the field of Android malware detection. On the other hand, ML-based malware detection also faces the threat of adversarial attacks. Recently, some research has demonstrated the possibility of such attacks under the settings of white-box or grey-box. However, a more practical threat model - black-box adversarial attack has not been well validated and evaluated. In this paper, we bridge this research gap and propose a black-box adversarial attack approach, ShadowDroid, against ML-based Android malware detection. On a high level, ShadowDroid tries to construct a substitute model of the target malware detection system. Utilizing this substitute model, we can identify and modify the key features of a malicious app to generate an adversarial sample. During the experiment, we evaluated the effectiveness of ShadowDroid against nine ML-based Android malware detection frameworks. It achieved successful malware evading on five platforms. Based on these results, we also discuss how to design a robust malware detection system to prevent adversarial attacks.","PeriodicalId":309508,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE 27th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ShadowDroid: Practical Black-box Attack against ML-based Android Malware Detection\",\"authors\":\"Jin Zhang, Chennan Zhang, Xiangyu Liu, Yuncheng Wang, Wenrui Diao, Shanqing Guo\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICPADS53394.2021.00084\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Machine learning (ML) techniques have been widely deployed in the field of Android malware detection. On the other hand, ML-based malware detection also faces the threat of adversarial attacks. Recently, some research has demonstrated the possibility of such attacks under the settings of white-box or grey-box. However, a more practical threat model - black-box adversarial attack has not been well validated and evaluated. In this paper, we bridge this research gap and propose a black-box adversarial attack approach, ShadowDroid, against ML-based Android malware detection. On a high level, ShadowDroid tries to construct a substitute model of the target malware detection system. Utilizing this substitute model, we can identify and modify the key features of a malicious app to generate an adversarial sample. During the experiment, we evaluated the effectiveness of ShadowDroid against nine ML-based Android malware detection frameworks. It achieved successful malware evading on five platforms. Based on these results, we also discuss how to design a robust malware detection system to prevent adversarial attacks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":309508,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2021 IEEE 27th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)\",\"volume\":\"52 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2021 IEEE 27th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPADS53394.2021.00084\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2021 IEEE 27th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPADS53394.2021.00084","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
ShadowDroid: Practical Black-box Attack against ML-based Android Malware Detection
Machine learning (ML) techniques have been widely deployed in the field of Android malware detection. On the other hand, ML-based malware detection also faces the threat of adversarial attacks. Recently, some research has demonstrated the possibility of such attacks under the settings of white-box or grey-box. However, a more practical threat model - black-box adversarial attack has not been well validated and evaluated. In this paper, we bridge this research gap and propose a black-box adversarial attack approach, ShadowDroid, against ML-based Android malware detection. On a high level, ShadowDroid tries to construct a substitute model of the target malware detection system. Utilizing this substitute model, we can identify and modify the key features of a malicious app to generate an adversarial sample. During the experiment, we evaluated the effectiveness of ShadowDroid against nine ML-based Android malware detection frameworks. It achieved successful malware evading on five platforms. Based on these results, we also discuss how to design a robust malware detection system to prevent adversarial attacks.