用于防御内部威胁的概念验证SDN和蜜罐系统

Meatasit Karakate, H. Esaki, H. Ochiai
{"title":"用于防御内部威胁的概念验证SDN和蜜罐系统","authors":"Meatasit Karakate, H. Esaki, H. Ochiai","doi":"10.1145/3507509.3507511","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays, ransomware attacks are becoming more popular because they allow attackers to receive ransom payments from their victims. While older ransomware used to spread using social engineering means, modern ransomware tends to also be equipped with worm-like features. This allows it to propagate from the initially infected device to other computers in the same network. Those attacks motivated us to propose SDNHive, a proof-of-concept SDN and Honeypot-based protection system that can protect clean devices from being attacked by ransomware-infected devices in the same network. For intrusion protection, SDNHive implements address blacklisting, connection blocking, and transparent traffic rerouting inside the controller. These functions are called by the honeypot through our custom API once malicious activities are detected. Therefore, the honeypot in our system is not simply a decoy host, but a real intrusion detection device that can detect SMB and ARP scans. Our system is unique since state-of-the-art systems use only the SDN controller for both detection and protection. Still, we also implement the SMB and ARP scan detection functions inside the SDN controller as well in order to compare both SDN-only and SDN+Honeypot approaches. To demonstrate the performance of SDNHive, we create a Virtual Malware Testbed that simulates a real-life network with the ONOS SDN controller, the honeypot, and a mix of Linux and Windows virtual machines. We evaluate our system by using it to prevent WannaCry, a well-known SMB ransomware, from propagating to other hosts inside our testbed. Additionally, we also monitor CPU usage for each of the functions inside the system. When using only the SDN controller, our system is able to detect WannaCry within 20 seconds from the start of the propagation. The CPU usage stays at about 20 percent. However, when we make both the SDN controller and the honeypot work together, WannaCry is detected in only 2.5 seconds, and the CPU load is negligible. This proves that our SDN+Honeypot approach is better than the current SDN-only solutions.","PeriodicalId":280794,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 11th International Conference on Communication and Network Security","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"SDNHive: A Proof-of-Concept SDN and Honeypot System for Defending Against Internal Threats\",\"authors\":\"Meatasit Karakate, H. Esaki, H. Ochiai\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3507509.3507511\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Nowadays, ransomware attacks are becoming more popular because they allow attackers to receive ransom payments from their victims. While older ransomware used to spread using social engineering means, modern ransomware tends to also be equipped with worm-like features. This allows it to propagate from the initially infected device to other computers in the same network. Those attacks motivated us to propose SDNHive, a proof-of-concept SDN and Honeypot-based protection system that can protect clean devices from being attacked by ransomware-infected devices in the same network. For intrusion protection, SDNHive implements address blacklisting, connection blocking, and transparent traffic rerouting inside the controller. These functions are called by the honeypot through our custom API once malicious activities are detected. Therefore, the honeypot in our system is not simply a decoy host, but a real intrusion detection device that can detect SMB and ARP scans. Our system is unique since state-of-the-art systems use only the SDN controller for both detection and protection. Still, we also implement the SMB and ARP scan detection functions inside the SDN controller as well in order to compare both SDN-only and SDN+Honeypot approaches. To demonstrate the performance of SDNHive, we create a Virtual Malware Testbed that simulates a real-life network with the ONOS SDN controller, the honeypot, and a mix of Linux and Windows virtual machines. We evaluate our system by using it to prevent WannaCry, a well-known SMB ransomware, from propagating to other hosts inside our testbed. Additionally, we also monitor CPU usage for each of the functions inside the system. When using only the SDN controller, our system is able to detect WannaCry within 20 seconds from the start of the propagation. The CPU usage stays at about 20 percent. However, when we make both the SDN controller and the honeypot work together, WannaCry is detected in only 2.5 seconds, and the CPU load is negligible. This proves that our SDN+Honeypot approach is better than the current SDN-only solutions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":280794,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 11th International Conference on Communication and Network Security\",\"volume\":\"29 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 11th International Conference on Communication and Network Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3507509.3507511\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2021 11th International Conference on Communication and Network Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3507509.3507511","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

如今,勒索软件攻击变得越来越流行,因为它们允许攻击者从受害者那里获得赎金。虽然旧的勒索软件使用社会工程手段传播,但现代勒索软件往往也配备了类似蠕虫的功能。这允许它从最初受感染的设备传播到同一网络中的其他计算机。这些攻击促使我们提出了SDNHive,这是一个基于SDN和honeypot的概念验证保护系统,可以保护干净设备免受同一网络中感染勒索软件的设备的攻击。在入侵防御方面,SDNHive在控制器内部实现了地址黑名单、连接阻断、透明流量重路由等功能。一旦检测到恶意活动,蜜罐将通过我们自定义的API调用这些函数。因此,我们系统中的蜜罐不是一个简单的诱饵主机,而是一个真正的入侵检测设备,可以检测SMB和ARP扫描。我们的系统是独一无二的,因为最先进的系统只使用SDN控制器进行检测和保护。尽管如此,我们也在SDN控制器内部实现了SMB和ARP扫描检测功能,以便比较SDN-only和SDN+蜜罐方法。为了演示SDN hive的性能,我们创建了一个虚拟恶意软件测试平台,该平台模拟了一个真实的网络,其中包含ONOS SDN控制器、蜜罐以及Linux和Windows虚拟机的混合。我们通过使用它来评估我们的系统,以防止WannaCry(一种知名的SMB勒索软件)传播到我们测试台上的其他主机。此外,我们还监视系统中每个功能的CPU使用情况。当仅使用SDN控制器时,我们的系统能够在传播开始的20秒内检测到WannaCry。CPU使用率保持在20%左右。然而,当我们让SDN控制器和蜜罐一起工作时,仅在2.5秒内检测到WannaCry, CPU负载可以忽略不计。这证明了我们的SDN+蜜罐方法比目前的SDN-only解决方案更好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
SDNHive: A Proof-of-Concept SDN and Honeypot System for Defending Against Internal Threats
Nowadays, ransomware attacks are becoming more popular because they allow attackers to receive ransom payments from their victims. While older ransomware used to spread using social engineering means, modern ransomware tends to also be equipped with worm-like features. This allows it to propagate from the initially infected device to other computers in the same network. Those attacks motivated us to propose SDNHive, a proof-of-concept SDN and Honeypot-based protection system that can protect clean devices from being attacked by ransomware-infected devices in the same network. For intrusion protection, SDNHive implements address blacklisting, connection blocking, and transparent traffic rerouting inside the controller. These functions are called by the honeypot through our custom API once malicious activities are detected. Therefore, the honeypot in our system is not simply a decoy host, but a real intrusion detection device that can detect SMB and ARP scans. Our system is unique since state-of-the-art systems use only the SDN controller for both detection and protection. Still, we also implement the SMB and ARP scan detection functions inside the SDN controller as well in order to compare both SDN-only and SDN+Honeypot approaches. To demonstrate the performance of SDNHive, we create a Virtual Malware Testbed that simulates a real-life network with the ONOS SDN controller, the honeypot, and a mix of Linux and Windows virtual machines. We evaluate our system by using it to prevent WannaCry, a well-known SMB ransomware, from propagating to other hosts inside our testbed. Additionally, we also monitor CPU usage for each of the functions inside the system. When using only the SDN controller, our system is able to detect WannaCry within 20 seconds from the start of the propagation. The CPU usage stays at about 20 percent. However, when we make both the SDN controller and the honeypot work together, WannaCry is detected in only 2.5 seconds, and the CPU load is negligible. This proves that our SDN+Honeypot approach is better than the current SDN-only solutions.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信