中央银行抵押品,资产贱卖,监管和流动性

U. Bindseil
{"title":"中央银行抵押品,资产贱卖,监管和流动性","authors":"U. Bindseil","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2350657","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the potential roles of bank asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit to ensure banks' funding liquidity and solvency. Both asset liquidity and central bank haircuts are modelled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Asset liquidity, the central bank collateral framework and regulation determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation and financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible assets as central bank collateral and why a sudden non-anticipated reduction of asset liquidity, or a tightening of the collateral framework, can destabilize short term liabilities of banks. Finally, the model allows discussing how the collateral framework can be understood, beyond its essential aim to protect the central bank, as financial stability and non-conventional monetary policy instrument. JEL Classification: E42, G21","PeriodicalId":436944,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banking & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"35","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Central Bank Collateral, Asset Fire Sales, Regulation and Liquidity\",\"authors\":\"U. Bindseil\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2350657\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper analyses the potential roles of bank asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit to ensure banks' funding liquidity and solvency. Both asset liquidity and central bank haircuts are modelled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Asset liquidity, the central bank collateral framework and regulation determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation and financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible assets as central bank collateral and why a sudden non-anticipated reduction of asset liquidity, or a tightening of the collateral framework, can destabilize short term liabilities of banks. Finally, the model allows discussing how the collateral framework can be understood, beyond its essential aim to protect the central bank, as financial stability and non-conventional monetary policy instrument. JEL Classification: E42, G21\",\"PeriodicalId\":436944,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Central Banking & Reserves (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"69 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-11-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"35\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Central Banking & Reserves (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350657\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Central Banking & Reserves (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350657","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 35

摘要

本文分析了银行资产贱卖和求助央行信贷在保证银行资金流动性和偿付能力方面的潜在作用。资产流动性和中央银行减记都被建模为单位区间内的幂函数。资金稳定性被捕获为储户之间纯策略的战略银行运营博弈。资产流动性、央行抵押品框架和监管共同决定了银行体系实现期限转换和金融稳定的能力。该模型还解释了为什么银行倾向于使用流动性最低的合格资产作为央行抵押品,以及为什么资产流动性的突然减少或抵押品框架的收紧会破坏银行短期负债的稳定。最后,该模型允许讨论如何理解抵押品框架,超越其保护央行作为金融稳定和非常规货币政策工具的基本目标。JEL分类:E42, G21
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Central Bank Collateral, Asset Fire Sales, Regulation and Liquidity
This paper analyses the potential roles of bank asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit to ensure banks' funding liquidity and solvency. Both asset liquidity and central bank haircuts are modelled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Asset liquidity, the central bank collateral framework and regulation determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation and financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible assets as central bank collateral and why a sudden non-anticipated reduction of asset liquidity, or a tightening of the collateral framework, can destabilize short term liabilities of banks. Finally, the model allows discussing how the collateral framework can be understood, beyond its essential aim to protect the central bank, as financial stability and non-conventional monetary policy instrument. JEL Classification: E42, G21
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信