用于在云中并发执行安全环境的体系结构

Ramya Jayaram Masti, Claudio Marforio, Srdjan Capkun
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引用次数: 20

摘要

我们提出了一种架构,可以在多核系统上创建和管理多个并发安全执行环境。我们的架构适合在云环境中使用,其中每个用户可能需要一个独立的安全环境,可以在其中运行其敏感应用程序。我们的解决方案有效地扩展了像Intel TXT这样的架构,无论是在单核还是多核平台上,都只支持创建一个安全环境。与需要大量虚拟机管理程序参与的现有解决方案不同,我们的体系结构依赖于轻量级处理器扩展和一种新型的基于硬件的虚拟化TPM,该TPM支持来自不同vm的多个并发动态信任根请求。这与现代处理器中的虚拟化扩展一起,允许使用仅负责VM管理(即创建、删除、启动、关闭)的空闲管理程序,而不涉及安全执行环境的创建或管理。这种脱离不仅降低了管理程序的复杂性,还降低了它与来宾虚拟机的交互,从而降低了系统危害的风险。我们展示了我们的体系结构为客户机应用程序提供了独立的安全环境,它们可以在其中并发执行,并保护它们不受其他系统组件(包括恶意vm和外围设备)的侵害。我们还通过使用QEMU进行仿真和测试,证明了实现该体系结构的可行性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An architecture for concurrent execution of secure environments in clouds
We propose an architecture that enables the creation and management of multiple, concurrent secure execution environments on multi-core systems. Our architecture is suitable for use in cloud settings where each user may require an independent secure environment within which he can run his sensitive applications. Our solution effectively scales architectures like Intel TXT which, both on single- and multi-core platforms, support the creation of only one secure environment. Unlike existing solutions that require significant hypervisor participation, our architecture relies on light-weight processor extensions and a novel hardware-based virtualized TPM that supports multiple, concurrent dynamic root of trust requests from different VMs. This, together with the virtualization extensions in modern processors, allows the use of a disengaged hypervisor that is only responsible for VM management (i.e., creation, deletion, startup, shutdown) and is not involved in the creation or management of secure execution environments. Such disengagement not only reduces hypervisor complexity but also its interaction with guest VMs and hence, the risk of system compromise. We show that our architecture provides guest applications independent secure environments within which they can concurrently execute, and protects them against other compromised system components including malicious VMs and peripherals. We also demonstrate the feasibility of realizing our architecture by emulating and testing it using QEMU.
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