反制带内虫洞检测中的诬告与串通

D. Sterne, G. Lawler, R. Gopaul, B. Rivera, K. Marcus, P. Kruus
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引用次数: 15

摘要

面向manet的协同入侵检测技术利用普通计算主机作为网络入侵传感器。如果受到攻击,这些主机可能会向入侵检测系统注入虚假数据,以隐藏其活动或错误地指责行为良好的节点。涉及投票的拜占庭容错方法可能是适用的,但必须解决这样一个事实,即只有在特定时间处于特定拓扑位置的节点才有资格投票决定是否发生了攻击。我们在OLSR网络中自包含带内虫洞的原型分布式检测器的背景下研究这些问题。我们提出了一种机会主义投票算法,并给出了一个48节点测试平台的测试结果,在这个测试平台上,串通的攻击者对一对无辜的节点产生了确凿的虚假指控。结果表明,当OLSR选择的网络拓扑和路由提供足够数量的附近诚实观察者来投票击败攻击者时,机会主义投票可以即时抑制虚假指控。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Countering False Accusations and Collusion in the Detection of In-Band Wormholes
Cooperative intrusion detection techniques for MANETs utilize ordinary computing hosts as network intrusion sensors. If compromised, these hosts may inject bogus data into the intrusion detection system to hide their activities or falsely accuse well-behaved nodes. Approaches to Byzantine fault tolerance involving voting are potentially applicable, but must address the fact that only nodes in particular topological locations at particular times are qualified to vote on whether an attack occurred. We examine these issues in the context of a prototype distributed detector for self-contained, in-band wormholes in OLSR networks. We propose an opportunistic voting algorithm and present test results from a 48-node testbed in which colluding attackers generate corroborating false accusations against pairs of innocent nodes. The results indicate that opportunistic voting can instantaneously suppress false accusations when the network topology and routes chosen by OLSR provide a sufficient number of nearby honest observers to outvote the attackers.
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