{"title":"S-Promela:一种可执行规范安全策略语言","authors":"Ryma Abbassi, S. Fatmi","doi":"10.1109/COMNET.2009.5373568","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Security Policy constitutes the main basis of a secured system but can be its main vulnerability also since a wrongly configured policy or an inadequate one can be fatal for the system. Even if the network administrator is a high qualified person, the human interventions are error prone. Nevertheless, a formal specification can avoid such problem. This paper aims to give a first step towards a framework allowing to specify and to verify a given policy with respect to an expected one. Hence, we propose in this paper a new all-purpose security policy modeling based on the concepts of processes, channels, constraints, events and actions. This modeling is called all-purpose because it can be easily used to represent the several kinds of security rules i.e. authorization, obligation and prohibition. Moreover, it constitutes the first step towards the proposition of a new executable security specification language. This language, called S-Promela has a syntax supporting authorization, obligation and prohibition rules and a semantics facilitating the validation task.","PeriodicalId":185933,"journal":{"name":"2009 First International Conference on Communications and Networking","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"S-Promela: An executable specification security policies language\",\"authors\":\"Ryma Abbassi, S. Fatmi\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/COMNET.2009.5373568\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Security Policy constitutes the main basis of a secured system but can be its main vulnerability also since a wrongly configured policy or an inadequate one can be fatal for the system. Even if the network administrator is a high qualified person, the human interventions are error prone. Nevertheless, a formal specification can avoid such problem. This paper aims to give a first step towards a framework allowing to specify and to verify a given policy with respect to an expected one. Hence, we propose in this paper a new all-purpose security policy modeling based on the concepts of processes, channels, constraints, events and actions. This modeling is called all-purpose because it can be easily used to represent the several kinds of security rules i.e. authorization, obligation and prohibition. Moreover, it constitutes the first step towards the proposition of a new executable security specification language. This language, called S-Promela has a syntax supporting authorization, obligation and prohibition rules and a semantics facilitating the validation task.\",\"PeriodicalId\":185933,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2009 First International Conference on Communications and Networking\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2009 First International Conference on Communications and Networking\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/COMNET.2009.5373568\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2009 First International Conference on Communications and Networking","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/COMNET.2009.5373568","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
S-Promela: An executable specification security policies language
Security Policy constitutes the main basis of a secured system but can be its main vulnerability also since a wrongly configured policy or an inadequate one can be fatal for the system. Even if the network administrator is a high qualified person, the human interventions are error prone. Nevertheless, a formal specification can avoid such problem. This paper aims to give a first step towards a framework allowing to specify and to verify a given policy with respect to an expected one. Hence, we propose in this paper a new all-purpose security policy modeling based on the concepts of processes, channels, constraints, events and actions. This modeling is called all-purpose because it can be easily used to represent the several kinds of security rules i.e. authorization, obligation and prohibition. Moreover, it constitutes the first step towards the proposition of a new executable security specification language. This language, called S-Promela has a syntax supporting authorization, obligation and prohibition rules and a semantics facilitating the validation task.