{"title":"基于信誉的理性秘密共享","authors":"Jianghao Jin, Xie Zhou, Chuan-gui Ma, Xu An Wang","doi":"10.1109/INCoS.2016.40","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many of the existing rational protocols do not notice that some behavior of participants may be problematic. These participants themselves do not benefit from the behavior, while it reduces the utilities of other participants. Besides, this behavior will reduce the efficiency of the protocols. In this paper, a novel rational fair exchange protocol is proposed based on the reputation system. The computation of the reputation is completed by the third party, which reduces the computation work of the participants. The rational participants who get higher reputation in our protocol will obtain more utilities. The protocol can deal with the problem above because rational participants always hope to improve their utilities. Compared with other existing protocols, our protocol needs only one round. Furthermore, we prove that our protocol is rational fair.","PeriodicalId":102056,"journal":{"name":"2016 International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Rational Secret Sharing Relying on Reputation\",\"authors\":\"Jianghao Jin, Xie Zhou, Chuan-gui Ma, Xu An Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/INCoS.2016.40\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Many of the existing rational protocols do not notice that some behavior of participants may be problematic. These participants themselves do not benefit from the behavior, while it reduces the utilities of other participants. Besides, this behavior will reduce the efficiency of the protocols. In this paper, a novel rational fair exchange protocol is proposed based on the reputation system. The computation of the reputation is completed by the third party, which reduces the computation work of the participants. The rational participants who get higher reputation in our protocol will obtain more utilities. The protocol can deal with the problem above because rational participants always hope to improve their utilities. Compared with other existing protocols, our protocol needs only one round. Furthermore, we prove that our protocol is rational fair.\",\"PeriodicalId\":102056,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2016 International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS)\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2016 International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/INCoS.2016.40\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/INCoS.2016.40","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Many of the existing rational protocols do not notice that some behavior of participants may be problematic. These participants themselves do not benefit from the behavior, while it reduces the utilities of other participants. Besides, this behavior will reduce the efficiency of the protocols. In this paper, a novel rational fair exchange protocol is proposed based on the reputation system. The computation of the reputation is completed by the third party, which reduces the computation work of the participants. The rational participants who get higher reputation in our protocol will obtain more utilities. The protocol can deal with the problem above because rational participants always hope to improve their utilities. Compared with other existing protocols, our protocol needs only one round. Furthermore, we prove that our protocol is rational fair.