基于信誉的理性秘密共享

Jianghao Jin, Xie Zhou, Chuan-gui Ma, Xu An Wang
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引用次数: 3

摘要

许多现有的理性协议没有注意到参与者的某些行为可能是有问题的。这些参与者本身并没有从这种行为中受益,而它却降低了其他参与者的效用。此外,这种行为会降低协议的效率。本文提出了一种基于信誉系统的新型理性公平交易协议。信誉的计算由第三方完成,减少了参与者的计算工作量。在我们的协议中获得较高声誉的理性参与者将获得更多的效用。协议可以解决上述问题,因为理性参与者总是希望提高他们的效用。与其他现有协议相比,我们的协议只需要一轮。进一步证明了该协议是合理公平的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Rational Secret Sharing Relying on Reputation
Many of the existing rational protocols do not notice that some behavior of participants may be problematic. These participants themselves do not benefit from the behavior, while it reduces the utilities of other participants. Besides, this behavior will reduce the efficiency of the protocols. In this paper, a novel rational fair exchange protocol is proposed based on the reputation system. The computation of the reputation is completed by the third party, which reduces the computation work of the participants. The rational participants who get higher reputation in our protocol will obtain more utilities. The protocol can deal with the problem above because rational participants always hope to improve their utilities. Compared with other existing protocols, our protocol needs only one round. Furthermore, we prove that our protocol is rational fair.
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