这只狡猾的小猪去了Android广告市场:滥用移动传感器进行隐形数据泄露

Michalis Diamantaris, Serafeim Moustakas, Lichao Sun, S. Ioannidis, Jason Polakis
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引用次数: 3

摘要

移动传感器改变了用户与现代智能手机的互动方式,增强了他们的整体体验。然而,缺乏足够的访问控制来保护这些传感器,导致了大量的威胁。正如之前的研究表明的那样,恶意应用程序和网站可以利用从传感器捕获的数据进行广泛的攻击。不幸的是,正如我们所展示的,在现代应用生态系统中,大多数应用获取并呈现第三方网页内容,攻击者可以使用广告来进行攻击。在本文中,我们介绍了一种新的攻击向量,它滥用广告生态系统来提供利用移动传感器的复杂而隐蔽的攻击。这些攻击不依赖于任何特殊的应用权限或特定的用户操作,并且由于WebView中传感器数据的访问控制不当而影响所有包含应用内广告的Android应用。我们概述了如何在两种不同的攻击场景中使用运动传感器数据来推断用户的敏感触摸输入(例如,信用卡信息),即应用程序内部和应用程序之间的数据泄露。前者针对的是显示广告的应用,后者影响设备上运行的所有其他Android应用。更糟糕的是,我们发现Android的应用隔离、生命周期管理和访问控制机制存在严重缺陷,即使在显示广告的应用被移到后台或被用户终止后,也会持续泄露数据。此外,由于应用内广告可以“搭载”应用核心功能的权限,它们还可以从受保护的传感器(如摄像头、麦克风和GPS)获取信息。为了对这种新出现的威胁进行全面评估,我们对官方Android Play商店中出现的应用程序中的广告进行了大规模的端到端动态分析。我们的研究表明,野外广告已经在访问和泄露从运动传感器获得的数据,因此强调需要更严格的访问控制策略和隔离机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
This Sneaky Piggy Went to the Android Ad Market: Misusing Mobile Sensors for Stealthy Data Exfiltration
Mobile sensors have transformed how users interact with modern smartphones and enhance their overall experience. However, the absence of sufficient access control for protecting these sensors enables a plethora of threats. As prior work has shown, malicious apps and sites can deploy a wide range of attacks that use data captured from sensors. Unfortunately, as we demonstrate, in the modern app ecosystem where most apps fetch and render third-party web content, attackers can use ads for delivering attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel attack vector that misuses the advertising ecosystem for delivering sophisticated and stealthy attacks that leverage mobile sensors. These attacks do not depend on any special app permissions or specific user actions, and affect all Android apps that contain in-app advertisements due to the improper access control of sensor data in WebView. We outline how motion sensor data can be used to infer users' sensitive touch input (e.g., credit card information) in two distinct attack scenarios, namely intra-app and inter-app data exfiltration. While the former targets the app displaying the ad, the latter affects every other Android app running on the device. To make matters worse, we have uncovered serious flaws in Android's app isolation, life cycle management, and access control mechanisms that enable persistent data exfiltration even after the app showing the ad is moved to the background or terminated by the user. Furthermore, as in-app ads can "piggyback" on the permissions intended for the app's core functionality, they can also obtain information from protected sensors such as the camera, microphone and GPS. To provide a comprehensive assessment of this emerging threat, we conduct a large-scale, end-to-end, dynamic analysis of ads shown in apps available in the official Android Play Store. Our study reveals that ads in the wild are already accessing and leaking data obtained from motion sensors, thus highlighting the need for stricter access control policies and isolation mechanisms.
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