作为外部客体的物质集合体莱布尼茨论体或集合体的本体论地位

S. Edamura
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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据罗伯特·m·亚当斯的解释,莱布尼茨认为,物质的集合存在于将它们视为一体的心灵中。对莱布尼茨来说,集合体依赖于精神,因为它的存在是通过精神活动来实现的。由于莱布尼茨认为存在和统一是可以转换的,而集合的统一完全依赖于心灵,亚当斯认为莱布尼茨认为集合存在于心灵中。在本文中,我反对亚当斯关于物质集合体是外部客体的观点。我展示了一些支持这种解释的段落。我进一步阐明,集合体中的物质有一个显著的共同特征,集合体作为一个外部对象存在于心灵的关系中是可能的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Aggregate of Substances as an External Object Leibniz on the Ontological Status of Body or Aggregate
According to Robert M. Adams’ interpretation, Leibniz holds that an aggregate of substances exists in the mind that perceives them as one being. For Leibniz, an aggregate is dependent upon a mind since its being is realized by a mental action. Since Leibniz states that being and unity are convertible, and the unity of an aggregate is completely dependent upon mind, Adams takes Leibniz to hold that an aggregate exists in the mind. In this paper, I argue against Adams that an aggregate of substances is an external object. I show that there are passages that support this interpretation. I further make clear that substances in an aggregate have a remarkable feature in common, and it is possible that an aggregate exists in relation to a mind as an external object.
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