智能电网通信环境下虚拟电厂及其市场调度的Stackelberg博弈论策略

Weiqi Hua, Hongjian Sun, Hao Xiao, W. Pei
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引用次数: 5

摘要

为了对虚拟电厂和相应的能源市场运行进行调度,提出了一个两情景Stackelberg博弈论模型来描述市场运营商和VPP运营商之间的相互作用。在市场运行过程中,考虑到VPP运营商的电力损失最小化,市场运营商是决定市场清洁价格的博弈领导者;而在VPP运行过程中,考虑到电力买卖双方的市场交易平衡,VPP运营商成为通过适当的货币补偿促进需求侧管理(DSM)的领导者。实现了电力调度和市场平衡的最优调度策略。通过IEEE 30总线测试系统验证了所提出的Stackelberg博弈论模型的有效性。市场调度促进了vpp之间的电力交换。VPP调度评估最优货币补偿率,以激励电力需求侧管理,包括负荷转移和减载。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Strategies for Virtual Power Plant and Associated Market Scheduling Under Smart Grid Communication Environment
In order to schedule the virtual power plant and corresponding energy market operation, a two-scenario Stackelberg game-theoretic model is proposed to describe interactions between market operator and VPP operator. During market operation, the market operator is a leader of the game to decide market cleaning prices, considering the power loss minimization of VPP operator, whereas during VPP operation, the VPP operator becomes a leader to facilitate the demand side management (DSM) through proper monetary compensation, considering the market trading balance between power sellers and power buyers. An optimal scheduling strategy including power dispatch and market balance will be realised. Case studies prove the effectiveness of the proposed Stackelberg game-theoretic model through IEEE 30-bus test system. The market scheduling promotes the power exchange among VPPs. The VPP scheduling evaluates the optimal monetary compensation rate to motivate the DSM including load shifting and load curtailment.
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