{"title":"数字二元论与“言语即思想”悖论","authors":"K. Gelber, S. Brison","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190883591.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter critiques the view, expressed in the 1996 Barlow Declaration and elsewhere, that the digital realm—“cyberspace”—is a disembodied space for pure thought. This chapter shows that the view that speech online is disconnected from the material realm echoes the same idea in traditional free speech theory, which has long considered speech to be something nonmaterial. Given the agent-driven nature of online communications, the materiality of internet technology, and the very real, often physical, effects of online speech on users and audiences, the chapter argues that the view that the digital realm has its own ontological status, distinct from that of the material world, is unsupportable. The chapter concludes that it is incorrect to hold that online communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct, just as it is incorrect to hold that offline communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct.","PeriodicalId":359550,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech in the Digital Age","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Digital Dualism and the “Speech as Thought” Paradox\",\"authors\":\"K. Gelber, S. Brison\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/OSO/9780190883591.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter critiques the view, expressed in the 1996 Barlow Declaration and elsewhere, that the digital realm—“cyberspace”—is a disembodied space for pure thought. This chapter shows that the view that speech online is disconnected from the material realm echoes the same idea in traditional free speech theory, which has long considered speech to be something nonmaterial. Given the agent-driven nature of online communications, the materiality of internet technology, and the very real, often physical, effects of online speech on users and audiences, the chapter argues that the view that the digital realm has its own ontological status, distinct from that of the material world, is unsupportable. The chapter concludes that it is incorrect to hold that online communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct, just as it is incorrect to hold that offline communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct.\",\"PeriodicalId\":359550,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Free Speech in the Digital Age\",\"volume\":\"54 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-04-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Free Speech in the Digital Age\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190883591.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Free Speech in the Digital Age","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190883591.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Digital Dualism and the “Speech as Thought” Paradox
This chapter critiques the view, expressed in the 1996 Barlow Declaration and elsewhere, that the digital realm—“cyberspace”—is a disembodied space for pure thought. This chapter shows that the view that speech online is disconnected from the material realm echoes the same idea in traditional free speech theory, which has long considered speech to be something nonmaterial. Given the agent-driven nature of online communications, the materiality of internet technology, and the very real, often physical, effects of online speech on users and audiences, the chapter argues that the view that the digital realm has its own ontological status, distinct from that of the material world, is unsupportable. The chapter concludes that it is incorrect to hold that online communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct, just as it is incorrect to hold that offline communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct.