数字二元论与“言语即思想”悖论

K. Gelber, S. Brison
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本章批判了1996年《巴洛宣言》和其他地方所表达的观点,即数字领域——“网络空间”——是纯粹思想的无实体空间。本章表明,网上言论与物质领域脱节的观点与传统言论自由理论中的观点相呼应,后者长期以来一直认为言论是非物质的。鉴于在线交流的代理人驱动性质,互联网技术的物质性,以及在线言论对用户和受众的非常真实的(通常是物理的)影响,本章认为,认为数字领域具有自己的本体论地位,与物质世界不同的观点是站不住脚跟的。这一章的结论是,认为在线交流在其因果能力上更类似于思想而不是非言语行为是不正确的,正如认为离线交流在其因果能力上更类似于思想而不是非言语行为是不正确的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Digital Dualism and the “Speech as Thought” Paradox
This chapter critiques the view, expressed in the 1996 Barlow Declaration and elsewhere, that the digital realm—“cyberspace”—is a disembodied space for pure thought. This chapter shows that the view that speech online is disconnected from the material realm echoes the same idea in traditional free speech theory, which has long considered speech to be something nonmaterial. Given the agent-driven nature of online communications, the materiality of internet technology, and the very real, often physical, effects of online speech on users and audiences, the chapter argues that the view that the digital realm has its own ontological status, distinct from that of the material world, is unsupportable. The chapter concludes that it is incorrect to hold that online communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct, just as it is incorrect to hold that offline communications are, in their causal capacity, more akin to thought than to non-speech conduct.
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