更新牧师和克莱因

Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Daniel Klerman
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在1984年的文章《诉讼纠纷的选择》(The Selection of Disputes for Litigation)中,普里斯特和克莱因提出了一个著名的假设,即在诉讼案件中“原告胜诉的趋势为50%”。然而,许多学者怀疑他们结论的有效性,因为他们所依赖的模型不符合现代严谨的标准。本文通过考虑三个修改来更新priestst - klein模型。首先,我们对普里斯特-克莱因模型提出了一种新颖的批评——它是非贝叶斯的——并表明,普里斯特和克莱因(1984)关于限制的大多数结果在一个修改后的模型下仍然有效,在这个模型中,当事人使用贝叶斯规则来改进他们对原告胜诉概率的估计。其次,我们表明,即使施加了激励相容机制,许多结果仍然对对称纳什均衡有效。最后,我们展示了如何修改priest克莱因模型来分析不对称信息,表明在这种修改下大多数结果都是错误的,并将修改后的priest克莱因模型与标准的不对称信息模型进行了比较。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Updating Priest and Klein
In their 1984 article, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” Priest and Klein famously hypothesized a “tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories” among litigated cases. Nevertheless, many scholars doubt the validity of their conclusions, because the model they relied upon does not meet modern standards of rigor. This article updates the Priest-Klein model by considering three modifications. First, we raise a novel critique of the Priest-Klein model — that it is non-Bayesian — and show that most of the results of Priest and Klein (1984) pertaining to limits nevertheless remain valid under a modified model in which parties use Bayes’ rule to refine their estimates of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing. Second, we show that even when an incentive-compatible mechanism is imposed, many of the results remain valid for symmetric Nash equilibria. Finally, we show how the Priest-Klein model can be modified to analyze asymmetric information, show that most results are false under this modification, and compare the modified Priest-Klein model to standard asymmetric information models.
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