买还是不买?:期权授予对高管股票购买的影响

Corporate Law: Corporate & Financial Law: Interdisciplinary Approaches eJournal Pub Date : 2010-04-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.891070

P. Grout, A. Zalewska

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引用次数: 8

摘要

我们提供了一个简单的非对称信息模型，表明与投资组合多样化的论点相反，高管期权和股票所有权之间存在天然的互补性。此外，如果被授予更多的高管选择权，经理人的境况可能会变得更糟。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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To Buy or Not to Buy?: The Effect of Option Granting on Executive Stock Purchases

We provide a simple asymmetric information model showing that, in contrast to portfolio diversification arguments, there is a natural complementarity between executive options and stock ownership. Moreover, managers can be made worse off by being granted more executive options.

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来源期刊

Corporate Law: Corporate & Financial Law: Interdisciplinary Approaches eJournal

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