{"title":"CEO税后薪酬激励与企业避税","authors":"Fabio B. Gaertner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1524390","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I examine the association between CEOs’ after-tax incentives and their firms’ level of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from additional incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using hand-collected data from proxy statements, I find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. I also find a positive association between the use of after-tax incentives and CEO cash compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated on an after-tax basis demand a premium for bearing additional risk.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"195","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance\",\"authors\":\"Fabio B. Gaertner\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1524390\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I examine the association between CEOs’ after-tax incentives and their firms’ level of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from additional incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using hand-collected data from proxy statements, I find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. I also find a positive association between the use of after-tax incentives and CEO cash compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated on an after-tax basis demand a premium for bearing additional risk.\",\"PeriodicalId\":239750,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-05-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"195\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1524390\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1524390","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance
I examine the association between CEOs’ after-tax incentives and their firms’ level of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from additional incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using hand-collected data from proxy statements, I find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. I also find a positive association between the use of after-tax incentives and CEO cash compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated on an after-tax basis demand a premium for bearing additional risk.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
