弱优先级分配和一般约束

Young-San Lin, Hai Nguyen, Thành Nguyen, K. Altinkemer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着新型冠状病毒感染症(COVID - 19)在美国和世界各地的流行,高效的社交距离座位成为体育场馆的一种选择。当游戏中有现场观众时,社交距离限制要求玩家之间保持6英尺的距离。根据座位的尺寸,这将转化为一定数量的空排和个人之间的空座位。因此,不可能让所有持票人都保持安全的社交距离。因此,有必要重新分配观众观看比赛。这个问题的一个重要特点是季票是按家庭分组的,只需要保持两个不同家庭之间的安全距离。同一个家庭的成员可以挨着坐。因此,一个大家庭需要更少的空位来保持社交距离。一个足球赛季大约有六场主场比赛。如果所有的比赛都给予大家庭优先权,那么很多人可以观看现场比赛,但结果将是非常不公平的。在效率和公平之间取得良好的平衡是一项艰巨的任务。我们将其建模为资源分配问题。它的新颖之处在于三个特征的结合:复杂的资源约束,相对于代理的弱优先级排序,以及相对于资源束的顺序偏好。我们开发了一种基于竞争稳定均衡(CSE)新概念的机制。它有几个吸引人的特性,统一了单边和双边市场的两种不同框架,并将现有方法扩展到更丰富的环境。CSE是竞争均衡的延伸,赋予预算以适应弱优先级。特别是,如果一个代理属于当前使用该资源的代理的最后一层,则它只需要为该资源付费。此外,价格只有在资源约束约束下才为正,即在竞争均衡中出现市场出清条件。因此,当agent被赋予相等的预算时,CSE是一个稳定且无嫉妒的结果,当资源约束为能力约束时,它是公平且帕累托最优的。另外,当一个CSE的座席预算不同时,对应于同一层座席之间的断接规则。打破规则可以提高效率,尤其是在资源约束很复杂的情况下。我们的框架还允许通过给代理不同的预算提供一种替代的、更灵活的打破捆绑规则。此外,当代理消费一捆商品时,它允许代理在不同的资源上“分配”他们的破坏预算。我们在体育场馆分配座位的应用中说明了这一点,并将我们的方法与其他平分方法进行了比较。我们根据经验运用我们的机制,在存在社交距离的情况下,将季票重新分配给家庭。仿真结果表明,该方法在效率和公平性方面都优于现有方法。然而,由于两个不同的原因,CSE不需要存在:固定预算的收入效应和捆绑偏好的互补性。为了克服这些问题,我们允许预算的ε-近似解,如buddish(《政治经济学杂志》,2011年),以及通过容纳一些额外的代理来违反资源约束,如Nguyen(《经济理论杂志》,2016年)。违反预算的情况可以是任意小的,违反资源约束的情况取决于代理可以消耗的最大捆绑包的大小。因此,我们的解决方案继承了单边和双边市场现有方法的效率和公平特性。我们的机制是基于Scarf引理对非线性约束的非平凡扩展,这可能是独立的兴趣。由于我们的框架的通用性,它适用于体育和娱乐事件之外的设置。例如,即使在保持社交距离的背景下,日托机构也面临着在一周的不同日子为儿童及其兄弟姐妹重新分配名额的类似问题。无家可归者收容所和难民营也需要重新分配家庭,以限制病毒的传播。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints
With COVID 19 prevalent in the USA and the world, efficient social distance seating became an option for sports venues. The social distancing constraint requires six feet between individuals when the game has live audiences. Depending on the seats' dimensions, this would translate to a certain number of empty rows and empty seats in a row between the individuals. As a result, it is not possible to seat all ticket holders with safe social distancing. Hence, it necessitates reassigning spectators to games. An important feature of this problem is that season tickets are grouped by family, and only a safe distance between two different families needs to be maintained. Members of the same family can sit next to each other. Therefore, a large family needs fewer empty seats per person to maintain social distancing. A football season has about six home games. If priority is given to larger families for all the games, then many people can watch the live games, but the outcome will be highly unfair. Striking a good balance between efficiency and fairness is a nontrivial task. We model this as a resource allocation problem. Its novelty is the combination of three features: complex resource constraints, weak priority ranking over agents, and ordinal preferences over bundles of resources. We develop a mechanism based on a new concept called Competitive Stable Equilibrium (CSE). It has several attractive properties, unifies two different frameworks of one-sided and two-sided markets, and extends existing methods to richer environments. CSE is an extension of competitive equilibrium with endowed budgets that accommodates weak priorities. In particular, an agent only needs to pay for a resource if he belongs to the last tier among the agents currently consuming the resource. Furthermore, the price is positive only if the resource constraint binds: a market clearing condition as in a competitive equilibrium. Thus, if agents are endowed with equal budgets, then a CSE is a stable and envy-free outcome, which is both fair and Pareto optimal when the resource constraints are capacity constraints. Moreover, a CSE when agents are given a different budget corresponds to a tie-breaking rule among agents of the same tier. Tie-breaking rules can improve efficiency, especially when resource constraints are complex. Our framework also allows for an alternative and more flexible tie-breaking rule by giving agents different budgets. Furthermore, when agents consume a bundle of goods, it allows agents to "distribute" their tie-breaking budget over different resources. We illustrate this in the application of assigning seats in sports venues and compare our method with other tie-breaking alternatives. We empirically apply our mechanism to reassign season tickets to families in the presence of social distancing. Our simulation results show that our method outperforms the existing ones in both efficiency and fairness measures. However, CSE need not exist because of two different reasons: the income effect of a fixed budget and the complementarities of bundled preferences. To overcome them, we allow for an ε-approximate solution of the budget as in Budish (Journal of Political Economy 2011), and a violation of resource constraints by accommodating a few extra agents as in Nguyen (Journal of Economic Theory 2016). The violation of the budget can be arbitrarily small, and the violation of resource constraints depends on the size of the largest bundle that an agent can consume. Our solution therefore, inherits the efficiency and fairness properties of existing methods for both one-sided and two-sided markets. Our mechanism is based on a nontrivial extension of Scarf's lemma to nonlinear constraints, which might be of independent interest. Because of the generality of our framework, it applies to settings beyond sport and entertainment events. For example, even in the context of social distancing, daycare facilities face a similar problem of reallocating slots to children and their siblings on different days of the week. Homeless shelters and refugee camps also need to reallocate families to limit the spread of the virus.
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