主体性权利说、侵权行为说与宪法:人格法的趋同理论基础

C. Visser
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摘要

鉴于司法部门所采取的方法,本文重新审视了将人格作为一种法律利益加以保护的成文法的理论基础。就这种方法而言,基于普通法和宪法考虑,人的人格并没有被表述为一种复合利益(即,在理论上,人的人格并没有被概念化为由各种分立的人格权利组成)。可以说,这种方法诋毁了传统的观点,即人的个性应该作为一种综合利益在法律上得到保护。因此,本文从普通法和宪法的角度,结合司法机构最近的做法的争议性,对人格法的理论基础进行了更仔细的探讨。在这方面,本文发现,普通法人格权(以主观权利学说和侵权行为为前提)与关于人格的基本宪法权利之间存在重叠,或者更具体地说存在趋同。从范围(即成文法中承认的各种人格利益)和框架(即成文法中对不同人格利益的区分和裁定)两方面来看,英美法系和英国宪法都证明了人格作为一种法律利益的复合性。在此基础上,我认为,这种趋同能够为人格作为一种法律利益的后宪法运作创造一个单一和综合的理论基础。这种单一而完整的理论基础为人格法在转型宪政范式和宪法的横向适用方面的进一步宪法化提供了基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Doctrine of Subjective Rights, the Actio Iniuriarum and the Constitution: A Convergent Doctrinal Basis for the Law of Personality
This article revisits the doctrinal basis of the positive law in protecting the human personality as a legal interest given the approach adopted by the judiciary. In terms of this approach, based on common law and constitutional considerations, the human personality is not articulated as a composite interest (ie the human personality is not doctrinally conceptualised as consisting of various discrete personality rights). Arguably, such an approach denigrates the traditional view that the human personality ought to be protected as a composite interest in law. Therefore, this article interrogates more carefully the doctrinal basis of the law of personality from the perspective of the common law and the Constitution in the light of the controversial nature of the judiciary’s recent approach. In this regard, the article finds that there is an overlap, or more specifically a convergence, between common-law personality rights (as premised on the doctrine of subjective rights and the actio iniuriarum) and fundamental constitutional rights regarding the human personality. The article demonstrates that in terms of scope (ie the various personality interests recognised in positive law) and framework (ie the differentiation and adjudication of the different personality interests in positive law), both the common law and the Constitution attest to the composite nature of the human personality as a legal interest. On this basis, I argue that such convergence enables the creation of a single and integrated doctrinal basis for the post-constitutional operation of the human personality as a legal interest. It is further argued that such a single and integrated doctrinal basis provides the foundation for the further constitutionalisation of the law of personality in terms of a transformative constitutionalism paradigm and the horizontal application of the Constitution.
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