基于信令博弈方法保护物联网交易免受双重支出攻击

Hafsa Benaddi, Mohammed Jouhari, Khalil Ibrahimi, A. Benslimane
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引用次数: 3

摘要

随着消费者对更高吞吐量、更大容量和更低延迟的大量需求,物联网(IoT)网络有望满足所需的安全和隐私要求。这项研究为关键的物联网应用提供了高交易吞吐量,特别是针对双重支出攻击的比特币安全性。为此,我们研究了信号博弈方法,在考虑玩家行为(恶意或诚实的矿工)和传入交易吞吐量的同时,对两个矿工之间的交互进行建模。据我们所知,这是第一个利用信号博弈来覆盖等待验证的传入交易随机性的工作,这会影响诚实矿工的行为。通过广泛的模拟,我们证明了我们提出的信令游戏减少了双重支出攻击对物联网交易的影响。结果还说明了在处理传入交易和矿工类型的不完整信息时,使用信号博弈来模拟两个矿工之间的交互的好处。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Securing IoT Transactions Against Double-Spending Attacks based on Signaling Game Approach
With considerable demand for higher throughput, greater capacity, and lower latency for consumers, the Internet of Things (IoT) network is anticipated to meet the desired security and privacy requirements. This study provides high transaction throughput on critical IoT applications, particularly Bitcoin security against double-spending attacks. To this end, we investigated the signaling game approach to model the interaction between two miners while considering players behavior (malicious or honest miners) and the incoming transaction throughput. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that exploits the signaling game to cover the incoming transactions randomness waiting for validation, which influences the honest miners behavior. With extensive simulations, we show that our proposed signaling game reduces the impact of double-spending attacks on IoT transactions. The results also illustrate the benefit of using the signaling game to model the interaction between two miners while handling the incomplete information of the incoming transactions and the type of miners.
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