Italy's security and defence policy: between EU and US, or just Prodi and Berlusconi?

It is, and it is bound to remain, a moot point whether the end of the cold war contributed to the end of Italy’s ‘First Republic’—and, if so, exactly how and how much. Yet it is a fact that, starting in 1992, the old party system of the post-war era crumbled and a new and still highly unstable one—born out of the new electoral law(s) enforced since 1994—took shape. Its main features have been a distinctly bipolar structure characterized by fragmented and fractious coalitions; a high degree of political litigiousness both across and inside political camps; and a growing role for their respective leaders as temporary ‘federators’. Silvio Berlusconi on the centre-right and Romano Prodi on the centre-left have emerged as such leaders, albeit with significant differences between them. This period (1994–), now labelled as Italy’s ‘Second Republic’, has basically coincided with the first steps of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), as outlined in the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in early 1992 and later perfected through successive revisions (in 1997 and 2000). Italy’s own foreign, security and defence policy has been confronted with multiple challenges: first, not unlike many other European countries, it had to adapt to the broader post-cold war environment and its unknowns; second, it had to strike a new balance between its traditional Atlanticist and European inclinations, more or less neatly separated between the USA and NATO link on the one hand, and the European Community link on the other, which until then had neither really clashed nor connected; third, it had to adjust its new and shaky internal set-up to the new international and regional developments; fourth, it also had to cope with the ever growing risk of being marginalized and excluded from the various exclusive ‘clubs’ that seemed to take shape on certain policy areas: dedicated Contact Groups, the euro-zone, Schengen, permanent membership of the UN Security Council and others. The first Berlusconi government in 1994 was too short-lived to make a lasting impact on Italian attitudes and priorities, although it managed to send around some unconventional messages. Albeit briefly, the traditional bipartisan consensus on European policy, that dated back to 1977, seemed to be put into question. Berlusconi-I was soon followed by a series of governments—led by Lamberto Dini (1995–1996) and then Romano Prodi (1996–1998)—that tried to rehash the foreign policy traditions of the First Republic, possibly with an even stronger European flavour and focus. This was certainly due also to the centrality of the launching of European Monetary Union and its domestic implications: it is not by accident that the positive outcome of Italy’s quest for EMU membership, in the spring of 1998, was soon followed by the collapse of the Prodi government,