{"title":"薪酬上的言论重要吗?来自美国“薪酬话语权”提案的证据","authors":"Natasha Burns, Kristina Minnick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1558435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the effect of say-on-pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non-SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. Although the total compensation does not change, the mix of compensation does change – companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non-CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases significantly less than non-SOP firms’. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash-based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.","PeriodicalId":177971,"journal":{"name":"Economic Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law eJournal","volume":"1999 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does Say on Pay Matter? Evidence from Say-on-Pay Proposals in the United States\",\"authors\":\"Natasha Burns, Kristina Minnick\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1558435\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate the effect of say-on-pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non-SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. Although the total compensation does not change, the mix of compensation does change – companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non-CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases significantly less than non-SOP firms’. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash-based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.\",\"PeriodicalId\":177971,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"1999 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1558435\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Perspectives on Employment & Labor Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1558435","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Does Say on Pay Matter? Evidence from Say-on-Pay Proposals in the United States
We investigate the effect of say-on-pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non-SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. Although the total compensation does not change, the mix of compensation does change – companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non-CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases significantly less than non-SOP firms’. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash-based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
