上市还是不上市:强制性透明度的代价

Yifeng Guo, Joshua Mitts
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引用次数: 2

摘要

公开市场是透明的机构,信息披露是强制性的,秩序流动是可观察的。我们表明,透明度可能导致信息获取不足和投资效率低下。我们的模型将公司对公开市场的偏好与披露指标的质量联系起来。当短期信号偏离项目的长期价值时,企业家更喜欢不透明的私人市场,在那里投资者可以就获取信息的成本进行讨价还价。不完善的沟通是一种强制披露可能破坏价值的机制,导致公司保持私有。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Going Public or Staying Private: The Cost of Mandated Transparency
Public markets are transparent institutions, where disclosure is mandatory and order flow observable. We show that transparency can lead to insufficient information acquisition and inefficient investment. Our model links a firm's preference for public markets to the quality of disclosure metrics. When short-term signals diverge from the long-run value of a project, entrepreneurs prefer opaque private markets where investors can bargain over the costs of acquiring information. Imperfect communication is a mechanism by which mandatory disclosure may destroy value, leading firms to remain private.
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