中央银行独立的理由:对国际辩论中关键问题的回顾

Benjamin Vonessen, K. Arnold, Rodolfo Dall’Orto Mas, Christian Fehlker
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引用次数: 12

摘要

本文分析了央行职责、角色和工具的显著扩张如何对货币政策的独立性构成挑战。本文特别回顾了2007年全球金融危机(GFC)对央行独立性带来的一些关键挑战,并评估了这些挑战在过去几年中对世界各地选定的央行在法律上和事实上的独立性的影响。报告发现,尽管央行在法律上的独立性水平没有恶化,但世界上一些最大经济体的央行在事实上的独立性水平可能已经减弱。本文对全球金融危机期间针对央行的政策反应提出的关键批评提出了反驳,并得出结论认为,央行独立的理由一如既往地充分。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Case for Central Bank Independence: A Review of Key Issues in the International Debate
This Occasional Paper analyses how significant expansions in central banks’ mandates, roles and instruments can result in challenges to the independence of monetary policy. The paper reviews, in particular, some of the key challenges to central bank independence brought about by the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 and assesses their impact on the de jure and de facto independence of selected central banks around the world in the past few years. It finds that although the level of de jure (legal) central bank independence did not deteriorate, the level of de facto (actual) independence of the central banks of some of the largest economies in the world may have weakened. The paper presents counterarguments to the key critiques raised against central banks due to their policy response during the GFC, and concludes that the case for central bank independence is as strong as ever.
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