货币政策的信息效应:自我挫败还是最优?

Wesley Janson, Chengcheng Jia
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引用次数: 2

摘要

随着美联储在联邦基金目标利率方面的决策变得更加透明,公众已开始不仅将该利率视为基准利率,还将其视为反映经济状况的信号。然而,公众认为需要披露的具体信息并不清楚。我们研究了这个问题,发现货币政策决策所揭示的信息是关于未来产出增长的,而不是通货膨胀,而且这种信息效应在理论上是最优的,不会使利率政策弄巧成拙。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Information Effect of Monetary Policy: Self-Defeating or Optimal?
As the Federal Reserve has become more transparent about its decisions on the federal funds target rate, the general public has begun to regard the rate as not only a benchmark interest rate, but also as a signal about the state of the economy. However, the specific information considered by the public to be revealed is not clearly understood. We investigate this question and find that the information revealed by monetary policy decisions is regarding future output growth, not inflation, and that such an information effect is theoretically optimal and does not make interest-rate policies self-defeating.
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