{"title":"基于委托代理机制的电力市场市场力调节建模与分析","authors":"Yue Zhao, Jue Yu, Qiuna Cai, Hui Song, YU Peng, Chao Gong, Beiyu Gan, Jianbin Lin","doi":"10.1117/12.2674563","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since the construction of the domestic electricity spot market in 2017, the problem of market power abuse caused by high market concentration and poor demand-side flexibility has gradually become prominent, and the electricity market operators have gradually established a market power regulation system, with bidding price replacement and clearing price replacement as two common market power regulation measures. This paper constructs a market power regulation model based on the principal-agent mechanism and analyzes the market equilibrium and the decision interval of market participants of the above two market power regulation measures. The results show that both market power regulation measures can make the market equilibrium price be the regulated price, but under bidding price replacement regulation the market clearing quantity distorts the market resource allocation and the decision interval of market participants is narrower. Therefore, the clearing price replacement is recommended as market power regulation measures. Finally, this paper solves the optimal strategies of market participants and market operators, and concludes that the optimal strategies of market participants under both market power regulation measures are to make the market regulation ineffective, which verifies the effectiveness of market power regulation measures.","PeriodicalId":286364,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer Graphics, Artificial Intelligence, and Data Processing","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Modeling and analysis of market power regulation in electricity market based on principal-agent mechanism\",\"authors\":\"Yue Zhao, Jue Yu, Qiuna Cai, Hui Song, YU Peng, Chao Gong, Beiyu Gan, Jianbin Lin\",\"doi\":\"10.1117/12.2674563\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Since the construction of the domestic electricity spot market in 2017, the problem of market power abuse caused by high market concentration and poor demand-side flexibility has gradually become prominent, and the electricity market operators have gradually established a market power regulation system, with bidding price replacement and clearing price replacement as two common market power regulation measures. This paper constructs a market power regulation model based on the principal-agent mechanism and analyzes the market equilibrium and the decision interval of market participants of the above two market power regulation measures. The results show that both market power regulation measures can make the market equilibrium price be the regulated price, but under bidding price replacement regulation the market clearing quantity distorts the market resource allocation and the decision interval of market participants is narrower. Therefore, the clearing price replacement is recommended as market power regulation measures. Finally, this paper solves the optimal strategies of market participants and market operators, and concludes that the optimal strategies of market participants under both market power regulation measures are to make the market regulation ineffective, which verifies the effectiveness of market power regulation measures.\",\"PeriodicalId\":286364,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Conference on Computer Graphics, Artificial Intelligence, and Data Processing\",\"volume\":\"15 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Conference on Computer Graphics, Artificial Intelligence, and Data Processing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2674563\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Conference on Computer Graphics, Artificial Intelligence, and Data Processing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2674563","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Modeling and analysis of market power regulation in electricity market based on principal-agent mechanism
Since the construction of the domestic electricity spot market in 2017, the problem of market power abuse caused by high market concentration and poor demand-side flexibility has gradually become prominent, and the electricity market operators have gradually established a market power regulation system, with bidding price replacement and clearing price replacement as two common market power regulation measures. This paper constructs a market power regulation model based on the principal-agent mechanism and analyzes the market equilibrium and the decision interval of market participants of the above two market power regulation measures. The results show that both market power regulation measures can make the market equilibrium price be the regulated price, but under bidding price replacement regulation the market clearing quantity distorts the market resource allocation and the decision interval of market participants is narrower. Therefore, the clearing price replacement is recommended as market power regulation measures. Finally, this paper solves the optimal strategies of market participants and market operators, and concludes that the optimal strategies of market participants under both market power regulation measures are to make the market regulation ineffective, which verifies the effectiveness of market power regulation measures.