首席执行官内部债务激励和企业避税

Sabrina Chi, Shawn X. Huang, J. M. Sánchez
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引用次数: 59

摘要

本文考察了CEO内部债务持有(养老金福利和递延薪酬)与企业避税之间的关系。由于内部债务持有通常是公司的无担保和无资金支持的负债,首席执行官面临的风险与外部债权人面临的风险相似。因此,理论(Jensen和Meckling[1976])表明,内部债务持有会对CEO的风险偏好产生负面影响。在某种程度上,企业避税可能会导致未来现金流的高度波动,我们预计内部债务持有将抑制首席执行官参与避税交易。与预测一致,我们记录了CEO内部债务持有与避税之间的负相关关系。其他分析表明,在存在高违约风险和流动性威胁(养老金计划中的套现期权)的情况下,内部债务对避税的影响更加(不那么)明显。总的来说,我们的研究结果强调了调查CEO债务类薪酬对公司税收政策的影响的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering
This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.
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