僵尸跟踪:通过智能电路数据分析检测僵尸网络

Oluwatobi Fajana, Gareth Owenson, Ella Haig
{"title":"僵尸跟踪:通过智能电路数据分析检测僵尸网络","authors":"Oluwatobi Fajana, Gareth Owenson, Ella Haig","doi":"10.1109/NCA.2018.8548313","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Botnets are collections of infected computers that are controlled centrally by a botmaster, often for sending spam or launching denial of service attacks. The task to take down these botnets is often a cat and mouse game with operators frequently changing domains for their control infrastructure. More recently, operators have moved to using Tor, a pseudo-anonymous network for hosting services whereby identification is difficult. Additionally, because connections to the Tor network are encrypted, we cannot use traditional methods like Domain Name System (DNS) and traffic signatures to detect infected hosts. In this paper, we introduce TorBot Stalker: the first mechanism for detecting, de-anonymizing, and destroying Tor botnets. We use machine learning to analyse and fingerprint the timings and frequency of Tor network circuit data when routing botnet traffic, and build a detection mechanism that is able to identify infected hosts at the Tor network border, in real-time, while preserving the privacy of legitimate users. TorBot Stalker can be implemented at any node in the Tor network and can differentiate between botnets and legitimate applications like Internet Relay Chat (IRC) coming from the same host. Experimental data demonstrates an accuracy of 99% with few false positives. We then apply the technique at the entry to the Tor network to measure the fraction of traffic which is for botnet. We observed that Torbot Stalker is able to de-anonymize real botnets in the Tor network and further identify infected hosts and control servers.","PeriodicalId":268662,"journal":{"name":"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"TorBot Stalker: Detecting Tor Botnets Through Intelligent Circuit Data Analysis\",\"authors\":\"Oluwatobi Fajana, Gareth Owenson, Ella Haig\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/NCA.2018.8548313\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Botnets are collections of infected computers that are controlled centrally by a botmaster, often for sending spam or launching denial of service attacks. The task to take down these botnets is often a cat and mouse game with operators frequently changing domains for their control infrastructure. More recently, operators have moved to using Tor, a pseudo-anonymous network for hosting services whereby identification is difficult. Additionally, because connections to the Tor network are encrypted, we cannot use traditional methods like Domain Name System (DNS) and traffic signatures to detect infected hosts. In this paper, we introduce TorBot Stalker: the first mechanism for detecting, de-anonymizing, and destroying Tor botnets. We use machine learning to analyse and fingerprint the timings and frequency of Tor network circuit data when routing botnet traffic, and build a detection mechanism that is able to identify infected hosts at the Tor network border, in real-time, while preserving the privacy of legitimate users. TorBot Stalker can be implemented at any node in the Tor network and can differentiate between botnets and legitimate applications like Internet Relay Chat (IRC) coming from the same host. Experimental data demonstrates an accuracy of 99% with few false positives. We then apply the technique at the entry to the Tor network to measure the fraction of traffic which is for botnet. We observed that Torbot Stalker is able to de-anonymize real botnets in the Tor network and further identify infected hosts and control servers.\",\"PeriodicalId\":268662,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2018.8548313\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2018.8548313","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8

摘要

僵尸网络是由僵尸管理员集中控制的受感染计算机的集合,通常用于发送垃圾邮件或发起拒绝服务攻击。摧毁这些僵尸网络的任务通常是一场猫捉老鼠的游戏,运营商经常改变其控制基础设施的域名。最近,运营商已经转向使用Tor,这是一种用于托管服务的伪匿名网络,因此很难识别身份。此外,由于与Tor网络的连接是加密的,因此我们无法使用域名系统(DNS)和流量签名等传统方法来检测受感染的主机。在本文中,我们介绍了TorBot Stalker:第一种检测、去匿名化和破坏Tor僵尸网络的机制。在路由僵尸网络流量时,我们使用机器学习来分析和识别Tor网络电路数据的时间和频率,并构建一种检测机制,能够实时识别Tor网络边界上受感染的主机,同时保护合法用户的隐私。TorBot Stalker可以在Tor网络的任何节点上实现,并且可以区分僵尸网络和来自同一主机的合法应用程序,如Internet Relay Chat (IRC)。实验数据表明,准确率为99%,几乎没有误报。然后,我们将该技术应用于Tor网络的入口,以测量僵尸网络的流量比例。我们观察到,Torbot Stalker能够对Tor网络中的真实僵尸网络进行去匿名化,并进一步识别受感染的主机和控制服务器。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
TorBot Stalker: Detecting Tor Botnets Through Intelligent Circuit Data Analysis
Botnets are collections of infected computers that are controlled centrally by a botmaster, often for sending spam or launching denial of service attacks. The task to take down these botnets is often a cat and mouse game with operators frequently changing domains for their control infrastructure. More recently, operators have moved to using Tor, a pseudo-anonymous network for hosting services whereby identification is difficult. Additionally, because connections to the Tor network are encrypted, we cannot use traditional methods like Domain Name System (DNS) and traffic signatures to detect infected hosts. In this paper, we introduce TorBot Stalker: the first mechanism for detecting, de-anonymizing, and destroying Tor botnets. We use machine learning to analyse and fingerprint the timings and frequency of Tor network circuit data when routing botnet traffic, and build a detection mechanism that is able to identify infected hosts at the Tor network border, in real-time, while preserving the privacy of legitimate users. TorBot Stalker can be implemented at any node in the Tor network and can differentiate between botnets and legitimate applications like Internet Relay Chat (IRC) coming from the same host. Experimental data demonstrates an accuracy of 99% with few false positives. We then apply the technique at the entry to the Tor network to measure the fraction of traffic which is for botnet. We observed that Torbot Stalker is able to de-anonymize real botnets in the Tor network and further identify infected hosts and control servers.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信