授权与公司串通能力:评论

ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Firms & Other Social Institutions (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-12-22 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1742738

M. A. Han

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引用次数: 1

摘要

Lambertini和Trombetta(2002)将Vickers(1985)的古诺战略委托模型扩展到无限重复的环境中，并得出如果管理者串通，委托不影响卡特尔稳定性的结论。这一结果建立在管理者理性而所有者不理性的假设之上。这篇笔记表明，如果所有者行为完全理性，那么如果管理者串通，授权会提高卡特尔的稳定性。

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Delegation and Firms’ Ability to Collude: A Comment

Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers’ (1985) Cournot model of strategic delegation to an inﬁnitely repeated setting and conclude that delegation does not aﬀect cartel stability if managers collude. This result rests on the assumption that managers are rational, but owners are not. This note shows that if owners behave fully rational, then delegation improves cartel stability if managers collude.

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ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Firms & Other Social Institutions (Topic)

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