Petros Maniatis, T. J. Giuli, M. Roussopoulos, D. Rosenthal, Mary Baker
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P2P systems are exposed to an unusually broad range of attacks. These include a spectrum of denial-of-service, or attrition, attacks from low-level packet flooding to high-level abuse of the peer communication protocol. We identify a set of defenses that systems can deploy against such attacks and potential synergies among them. We illustrate the application of these defenses in the context of the LOCKSS digital preservation system.