信任与控制:风险投资条款表条款作为风险分配工具的价值效应

Jason M. Gordon, David Orozco
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引用次数: 2

摘要

风险投资协议的各方处于合作状态。各方通过对另一方不同程度的控制要求和对另一方的信任来解释企业家-投资者关系中的感知风险。各方感知到的风险水平可能会因未来股权交易的各个方面而有所不同。投资意向书的条款通过分配控制权或将决策权委托给某一方来描述交易各方的主观风险感知。在谈判条款清单条款时,一方应设法理解和认识另一方所感知到的风险,并试图提供必要的控制或信任水平,以实现为各方提供最大价值的关系协议。控制权和信任的最佳配置能够充分捕捉各方的感知风险,促进各方之间的合作,最终促进企业的绩效。了解投资交易各方的主观风险感知,将有助于达成为各方创造最大价值的投资意向书谈判目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Trust and Control: The Value Effect of Venture Capital Term Sheet Provisions as Risk Allocation Tools
The parties to a venture funding agreement are in a state of coopetition. The parties account for perceived risk in the entrepreneur-investor relationship through varying levels of control demanded from and trust afforded to the other party. The level of risk perceived by each party may differ along individual aspects of the prospective equity deal. The provisions of the term sheet delineate the subjective risk perceptions of each party to the transaction by allocating control or trusting a party with decision-making rights. When negotiating term sheet provisions, a party should seek to understand and recognize the risk perceived by the other party and attempt to afford the level of control or trust necessary to achieve a relational agreement that provides the greatest value for the parties collectively. An optimal allocation of control and trust adequately captures the perceived risk of each party, promotes cooperation between the parties, and ultimately facilitates the performance of the business venture. Understanding the subjective risk perceptions of each party to the investment transaction will facilitate the objective of negotiating a term sheet that maximizes the value created for all parties.
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