监事会报告:对监管缺乏了解

M. Lückerath-Rovers, M. Scheltema
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文调查了监事会报告(以下简称sb报告)在多大程度上为读者提供了有用的信息。我们对60家公司进行了调查,测试了与sb报告相关的所有需求。首先,我们调查sb -报告是否满足正式要求。此外,正在对报告向用户提供的洞察力程度作出判断。我们的调查显示,尽管《荷兰公司治理守则》(以下简称《守则》)要求这样做,但关于董事会监督管理委员会(以下简称“MB”)的方式,我们几乎没有得到什么见解。因此,我们请求《治罪法》在这方面更加具有描述性。同时,我们给出了sb报告的例子,在我们看来,这些报告确实提供了足够的洞察力,尽管偶尔如此。本文有助于讨论b准备对其工作的开放性。SBs的运作方式通常被认为是一个“黑盒子”。尽管股东可能会在股东年会上询问SBs对MB的监督执行情况,但他们-像其他利益相关者一样-手头的信息很少,无法形成合理的印象。本文不仅包含关于透明度的使用和法律要求的理论部分,而且还介绍了当前的实践。本文最后给出了一些可能有助于提高sb报告质量的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Supervisory Board Report: Little Insight About Oversight
This article investigates to what extent the report by the Supervisory Board (hereafter: the SB-report) provides the reader with useful information. We investigate this for sixty companies testing all requirements regarding the SB-report. First of all, we investigate whether the SB-report fulfils the formal requirements. Furthermore, a judgment is being rendered regarding the degree of insight that the report provides to the user. Our investigation shows that little insight can be obtained about the way in which the SB monitors the Management Board (hereafter: MB), even though the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (hereafter: the Code) requires this. Thus, we plead for the Code to become more descriptive in this respect. At the same time, we give examples of SB-reports that, in our view, do provide adequate insight, albeit occasionally. This article contributes to the discussion about the openness that Bs are prepared to give regarding their work. The way in which SBs operate is often felt as being a “black box”. Even though shareholders may query the SBs about the execution of their Supervision of the MB at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, they – like other stakeholders – have little information at hand to form themselves a reasonable impression thereof. This article not only contains a theoretical section regarding the use of transparency and legal requirements, but also takes a look at current practices. The article closes with some recommendations that may contribute to the quality of SB-reports.
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