国家、公司和董事层面的风险和责任以及独立董事薪酬

A. Melis, Luigi Rombi
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引用次数: 7

摘要

研究问题:本研究探讨了国家层面的制度特征、公司和独立董事层面的风险和责任如何以及在多大程度上与独立董事薪酬在数量和设计方面相关。研究结果/见解本研究以16个国家727家非金融上市公司的5220名独立董事为样本,揭示了国家层面的制度特征以及公司和董事层面的代理机构对独立董事薪酬水平变化的影响。公司层面的与ESG相关的声誉风险和董事层面的董事会可观察责任与独立董事的薪酬数额密切相关。这些代理关系在不同的制度环境中有所不同。国家层面的董事责任取代了公司层面和董事层面的监督。企业在独立董事薪酬设计上顺应制度压力。制度嵌入性来自公司的主要制度环境及其对外国金融市场的敞口。理论/学术意义本研究建立了独立董事薪酬前因的多层次理论。公司和董事层面的代理问题嵌套在股东和独立董事之间的代理关系嵌入的制度背景中,并与之相互作用。从业者/政策启示本研究帮助从业者理解董事责任法规、公司与ESG相关的声誉风险和董事会的具体责任如何与独立董事薪酬相关。它帮助公司向股东(和利益相关者)解释独立董事的薪酬是如何确定的。企业应该考虑到,其ESG实践的后果超出了直接成本。政策制定者可以发现我们的结果对监管董事责任和制定最佳实践有用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Country‐, Firm‐ and Director‐level Risk and Responsibilities and Independent Director Compensation
Research Question
This study investigates how and to what extent country‐level institutional characteristics, firm‐ and independent director‐level risk and responsibilities are related to independent director compensation, in terms of amount and design.

Research findings/Insights
Using an international sample of 5,220 independent directors on 727 non‐financial listed firms in 16 countries, this study revealed that both country‐level institutional characteristics and firm‐ and director‐level agency account for the variation of independent director compensation amount. Firm‐level ESG‐related reputational risk and director‐level observable responsibilities on the board are strongly related to independent director compensation amount. These agency relationships vary in the different institutional settings. Country‐level director liability substitutes for firm‐level and director‐level monitoring. Firms conform to institutional pressures for independent director compensation design. Institutional embeddedness comes from the firm’s primary institutional environment and its exposure to foreign financial markets.

Theoretical/Academic implications
This study develops a multilevel theory of the antecedents of independent director compensation. Firm‐ and director‐level agency issues are nested in, and interact with, the institutional context in which the agency relationship between shareholders and independent directors is embedded.

Practitioner/Policy Implications
This study helps practitioners to understand how director liability regulations, a firm’s ESG‐related reputational risk and the specific responsibilities on the board are related to independent director compensation. It helps firms explain to shareholders (and stakeholders) how independent director compensation is determined. Firms should consider that the consequences of their ESG practices extend beyond direct costs. Policymakers can find our results useful when regulating on director liability and developing best practices.

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