合作企业的绩效标准和驱动因素

J. Child, D. Faulkner, Stephen Tallman, Linda Hsieh
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第23章考察合作企业的绩效,这是一个复杂的问题。必须至少从三个方面来解决绩效问题;两个或两个以上的父母和合作实体。由于合作企业要么是母公司各业务单位之间的合同安排,要么是由母公司密切持有股权的独立组织,因此公司业绩的经典衡量标准往往不公开报告,甚至可能没有由母公司系统地收集。联盟作为一个运作实体的表现可能不等同于其对其合作伙伴或母公司的表现。例如,它可能会受到特许经营费和特许权使用费等各种付款的约束,这些付款对一方或另一方有利,损害联盟的财务业绩,但对整个系统有利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Performance criteria and drivers in cooperative ventures
Chapter 23 examines performance in cooperative ventures, a complex issue. The question of performance must be addressed from at least three perspectives; those of the two or more parents and the cooperative entity. Because cooperative ventures are either contractual arrangements between various operational units in the parents or are independent organizations with their equity closely held by the parents, classic measures of firm performance often are not reported publicly and may not even be collected systematically by the parents. The performance of an alliance as a functioning entity may not equate to its performance for its partner or parent companies. For example, it may be subject to a variety of payments such as franchising fees and royalties that benefit one or the other parent, hurt the financial performance of the alliance, but benefit the system as a whole.
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