一种与操作系统无关的内存取证方法

Andrea Oliveri, Matteo Dell'Amico, D. Balzarotti
{"title":"一种与操作系统无关的内存取证方法","authors":"Andrea Oliveri, Matteo Dell'Amico, D. Balzarotti","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2023.23398","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"—The analysis of memory dumps presents unique challenges, as operating systems use a variety of (often un-documented) ways to represent data in memory. To solve this problem, forensics tools maintain collections of models that precisely describe the kernel data structures used by a handful of operating systems. However, these models cannot be generalized and developing new models may require a very long and tedious reverse engineering effort for closed source systems. In the last years, the tremendous increase in the number of IoT devices, smart-home appliances and cloud-hosted VMs resulted in a growing number of OSs which are not supported by current forensics tools. The way we have been doing memory forensics until today, based on handwritten models and rules, cannot simply keep pace with this variety of systems. To overcome this problem, in this paper we introduce the new concept of OS-agnostic memory forensics , which is based on techniques that can recover certain forensics information without any knowledge of the internals of the underlying OS. Our approach allows to automatically identify different types of data structures by using only their topological constraints and then supports two modes of investigation. In the first, it allows to traverse the recovered structures by starting from predetermined seeds , i.e., pieces of forensics-relevant information (such as a process name or an IP address) that an analyst knows a priori or that can be easily identified in the dump. Our experiments show that even a single seed can be sufficient to recover the entire list of processes and other important forensics data structures in dumps obtained from 14 different OSs, without any knowledge of the underlying kernels. In the second mode of operation, our system requires no seed but instead uses a set of heuristics to rank all memory data structures and present to the analysts only the most ‘promising’ ones. Even in this case, our experiments show that an analyst can use our approach to easily identify forensics-relevant structured information in a truly OS-agnostic scenario.","PeriodicalId":199733,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An OS-agnostic Approach to Memory Forensics\",\"authors\":\"Andrea Oliveri, Matteo Dell'Amico, D. Balzarotti\",\"doi\":\"10.14722/ndss.2023.23398\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"—The analysis of memory dumps presents unique challenges, as operating systems use a variety of (often un-documented) ways to represent data in memory. To solve this problem, forensics tools maintain collections of models that precisely describe the kernel data structures used by a handful of operating systems. However, these models cannot be generalized and developing new models may require a very long and tedious reverse engineering effort for closed source systems. In the last years, the tremendous increase in the number of IoT devices, smart-home appliances and cloud-hosted VMs resulted in a growing number of OSs which are not supported by current forensics tools. The way we have been doing memory forensics until today, based on handwritten models and rules, cannot simply keep pace with this variety of systems. To overcome this problem, in this paper we introduce the new concept of OS-agnostic memory forensics , which is based on techniques that can recover certain forensics information without any knowledge of the internals of the underlying OS. Our approach allows to automatically identify different types of data structures by using only their topological constraints and then supports two modes of investigation. In the first, it allows to traverse the recovered structures by starting from predetermined seeds , i.e., pieces of forensics-relevant information (such as a process name or an IP address) that an analyst knows a priori or that can be easily identified in the dump. Our experiments show that even a single seed can be sufficient to recover the entire list of processes and other important forensics data structures in dumps obtained from 14 different OSs, without any knowledge of the underlying kernels. In the second mode of operation, our system requires no seed but instead uses a set of heuristics to rank all memory data structures and present to the analysts only the most ‘promising’ ones. Even in this case, our experiments show that an analyst can use our approach to easily identify forensics-relevant structured information in a truly OS-agnostic scenario.\",\"PeriodicalId\":199733,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.23398\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.23398","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

-内存转储的分析呈现出独特的挑战,因为操作系统使用各种(通常没有文档的)方式来表示内存中的数据。为了解决这个问题,取证工具维护了一组模型,这些模型精确地描述了少数操作系统使用的内核数据结构。然而,这些模型不能一般化,并且开发新模型可能需要对闭源系统进行漫长而乏味的逆向工程工作。在过去的几年里,物联网设备、智能家电和云托管虚拟机的数量急剧增加,导致越来越多的操作系统不受当前取证工具的支持。到目前为止,我们基于手写模型和规则进行内存取证的方式不能简单地跟上这种系统的变化。为了克服这个问题,在本文中,我们引入了与操作系统无关的内存取证的新概念,该概念基于可以在不了解底层操作系统内部的情况下恢复某些取证信息的技术。我们的方法允许通过仅使用拓扑约束来自动识别不同类型的数据结构,然后支持两种调查模式。首先,它允许从预先确定的种子开始遍历恢复的结构,即分析人员先验地知道的或可以在转储中轻松识别的取证相关信息片段(如进程名称或IP地址)。我们的实验表明,即使是一个种子也足以恢复从14个不同操作系统获得的转储中的整个进程列表和其他重要的取证数据结构,而无需了解底层内核。在第二种操作模式中,我们的系统不需要种子,而是使用一组启发式方法对所有内存数据结构进行排序,并只向分析人员呈现最“有前途”的数据结构。即使在这种情况下,我们的实验表明,分析人员可以使用我们的方法轻松地在真正与操作系统无关的场景中识别与取证相关的结构化信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An OS-agnostic Approach to Memory Forensics
—The analysis of memory dumps presents unique challenges, as operating systems use a variety of (often un-documented) ways to represent data in memory. To solve this problem, forensics tools maintain collections of models that precisely describe the kernel data structures used by a handful of operating systems. However, these models cannot be generalized and developing new models may require a very long and tedious reverse engineering effort for closed source systems. In the last years, the tremendous increase in the number of IoT devices, smart-home appliances and cloud-hosted VMs resulted in a growing number of OSs which are not supported by current forensics tools. The way we have been doing memory forensics until today, based on handwritten models and rules, cannot simply keep pace with this variety of systems. To overcome this problem, in this paper we introduce the new concept of OS-agnostic memory forensics , which is based on techniques that can recover certain forensics information without any knowledge of the internals of the underlying OS. Our approach allows to automatically identify different types of data structures by using only their topological constraints and then supports two modes of investigation. In the first, it allows to traverse the recovered structures by starting from predetermined seeds , i.e., pieces of forensics-relevant information (such as a process name or an IP address) that an analyst knows a priori or that can be easily identified in the dump. Our experiments show that even a single seed can be sufficient to recover the entire list of processes and other important forensics data structures in dumps obtained from 14 different OSs, without any knowledge of the underlying kernels. In the second mode of operation, our system requires no seed but instead uses a set of heuristics to rank all memory data structures and present to the analysts only the most ‘promising’ ones. Even in this case, our experiments show that an analyst can use our approach to easily identify forensics-relevant structured information in a truly OS-agnostic scenario.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信