竞选资金透明度影响立法者的选举结果和行为

A. Wood, C. Grose
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引用次数: 14

摘要

执行机构的审核是否会影响被审核者的行为?揭露立法者的负面信息会影响选举结果和行为吗?鼓励公开竞选资金等透明度的制度会影响大众和精英的行为。竞选资金透明度在立法竞选期间向选民提供有关候选人性格的信息,这些信息影响选民和立法者的行为。20世纪70年代,美国联邦选举委员会对10%的众议院议员进行了随机调查。这个联邦选举委员会项目是美国机构对联邦议员及其选民进行的唯一随机实验。我们发现,与对照组相比,经过审计的立法者更有可能退休,并面临更具竞争性的连任选举,这种影响在审计发现违反竞选财务的现任者中被放大。此外,竞选财务丑闻与现任者较低的选票份额和支持率有关;2000年代的负面广告也越来越多。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators’ Election Outcomes and Behavior
Do audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior. Campaign finance transparency provides information to voters during legislative campaigns about the character of candidates, and this information affects voter and legislator behavior. The U.S. Federal Election Commission conducted random audits of 10 percent of U.S. House members in the 1970s. This FEC program is the only randomized experiment a U.S. agency has conducted on federal legislators and their electorates. We find that audited legislators were more likely to retire and faced more competitive re-elections relative to the control group, an effect that is amplified among incumbents whose audits revealed campaign finance violations. Further, campaign finance scandals are associated with lower incumbent vote shares and approval; and more negative advertisements in the 2000s.
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