自动驾驶汽车安全:组合攻击、防御和策略表面

Michael Clifford, Miriam Heller, K. Levitt, M. Bishop
{"title":"自动驾驶汽车安全:组合攻击、防御和策略表面","authors":"Michael Clifford, Miriam Heller, K. Levitt, M. Bishop","doi":"10.1145/3584318.3584325","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"An attack surface enumerates resources accessible to an attacker for cyber attacks on a system. These resources are: methods that can be called as part of an attack; channels that an attacker outside the system can use to get to a system’s interface; and untrusted data that an attacker can use in conjunction with the system’s programs and channels. Historically, a system’s attacks surface has provided a metric on the vulnerability of a system, in part to compare two systems’ exposure to attack. In this paper we extend the attack surface to (1) include rules on the system’s methods and channels that if enforced would prevent many attacks, and (2) be a composition of more primitive surfaces each characterizing vulnerabilities associated with types of resources, application-specific or system-specific, e.g., files, directories, and channels. We also introduce two additional surfaces. The defense surface identifies system mechanisms that can thwart cyber-attacks through prevention, or through detection followed by mitigation of an attack in progress and then system restoration. The policy surface defines the security policy of a system as reflected by constraints on its interface expected to be satisfied in the system’s operation. The security policy for a corporation would include steps the organization takes to prevent attacks and actions required to address a security incident. More relevant to this paper, the security policy for a community of autonomous vehicles would specify the minimum separation among vehicles that must be maintained even in the presence of a cyber-attack, i.e. a (safety) property. Through an analysis of the intersection of the three surfaces, it is, in principle, possible to determine if a defense exists for every attack that causes a policy violation. And, through computationally-efficient model checking, the defense action can be identified. If more than one defense action exists, model checking will identify all of them, thus enabling the selection of the optimal action based on criteria associated with a CAV.","PeriodicalId":383761,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 New Security Paradigms Workshop","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Autonomous Vehicle Security: Composing Attack, Defense, and Policy Surfaces\",\"authors\":\"Michael Clifford, Miriam Heller, K. Levitt, M. Bishop\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3584318.3584325\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"An attack surface enumerates resources accessible to an attacker for cyber attacks on a system. These resources are: methods that can be called as part of an attack; channels that an attacker outside the system can use to get to a system’s interface; and untrusted data that an attacker can use in conjunction with the system’s programs and channels. Historically, a system’s attacks surface has provided a metric on the vulnerability of a system, in part to compare two systems’ exposure to attack. In this paper we extend the attack surface to (1) include rules on the system’s methods and channels that if enforced would prevent many attacks, and (2) be a composition of more primitive surfaces each characterizing vulnerabilities associated with types of resources, application-specific or system-specific, e.g., files, directories, and channels. We also introduce two additional surfaces. The defense surface identifies system mechanisms that can thwart cyber-attacks through prevention, or through detection followed by mitigation of an attack in progress and then system restoration. The policy surface defines the security policy of a system as reflected by constraints on its interface expected to be satisfied in the system’s operation. The security policy for a corporation would include steps the organization takes to prevent attacks and actions required to address a security incident. More relevant to this paper, the security policy for a community of autonomous vehicles would specify the minimum separation among vehicles that must be maintained even in the presence of a cyber-attack, i.e. a (safety) property. Through an analysis of the intersection of the three surfaces, it is, in principle, possible to determine if a defense exists for every attack that causes a policy violation. And, through computationally-efficient model checking, the defense action can be identified. If more than one defense action exists, model checking will identify all of them, thus enabling the selection of the optimal action based on criteria associated with a CAV.\",\"PeriodicalId\":383761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2022 New Security Paradigms Workshop\",\"volume\":\"7 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2022 New Security Paradigms Workshop\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3584318.3584325\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2022 New Security Paradigms Workshop","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3584318.3584325","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

攻击面列举了攻击者对系统进行网络攻击时可以访问的资源。这些资源是:可以作为攻击的一部分调用的方法;系统外的攻击者可以利用通道到达系统接口;以及攻击者可以将其与系统程序和通道结合使用的不可信数据。从历史上看,系统的攻击面提供了系统脆弱性的度量,部分是为了比较两个系统暴露于攻击的风险。在本文中,我们将攻击面扩展到(1)包括关于系统方法和通道的规则,如果强制执行将阻止许多攻击,并且(2)是更原始的表面的组合,每个表面表征与资源类型相关的漏洞,特定于应用程序或特定于系统,例如,文件,目录和通道。我们还引入了两个额外的曲面。防御面识别系统机制,通过预防或检测阻止网络攻击,然后减轻正在进行的攻击,然后恢复系统。策略界面定义了系统的安全策略,这反映在系统操作中需要满足的接口约束上。公司的安全策略将包括组织为防止攻击所采取的步骤和处理安全事件所需的操作。与本文更相关的是,自动驾驶汽车社区的安全策略将指定即使在存在网络攻击的情况下也必须保持的车辆之间的最小分离,即(安全)属性。通过分析这三个表面的交集,原则上可以确定是否存在针对导致违反策略的每次攻击的防御。并且,通过计算效率高的模型校核,可以识别出防御动作。如果存在一个以上的防御动作,模型检查将识别所有的防御动作,从而能够根据与CAV相关的标准选择最优的防御动作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Autonomous Vehicle Security: Composing Attack, Defense, and Policy Surfaces
An attack surface enumerates resources accessible to an attacker for cyber attacks on a system. These resources are: methods that can be called as part of an attack; channels that an attacker outside the system can use to get to a system’s interface; and untrusted data that an attacker can use in conjunction with the system’s programs and channels. Historically, a system’s attacks surface has provided a metric on the vulnerability of a system, in part to compare two systems’ exposure to attack. In this paper we extend the attack surface to (1) include rules on the system’s methods and channels that if enforced would prevent many attacks, and (2) be a composition of more primitive surfaces each characterizing vulnerabilities associated with types of resources, application-specific or system-specific, e.g., files, directories, and channels. We also introduce two additional surfaces. The defense surface identifies system mechanisms that can thwart cyber-attacks through prevention, or through detection followed by mitigation of an attack in progress and then system restoration. The policy surface defines the security policy of a system as reflected by constraints on its interface expected to be satisfied in the system’s operation. The security policy for a corporation would include steps the organization takes to prevent attacks and actions required to address a security incident. More relevant to this paper, the security policy for a community of autonomous vehicles would specify the minimum separation among vehicles that must be maintained even in the presence of a cyber-attack, i.e. a (safety) property. Through an analysis of the intersection of the three surfaces, it is, in principle, possible to determine if a defense exists for every attack that causes a policy violation. And, through computationally-efficient model checking, the defense action can be identified. If more than one defense action exists, model checking will identify all of them, thus enabling the selection of the optimal action based on criteria associated with a CAV.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信